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The Kentucky Bill of Rights: A
Bicentennial Celebration
By KEN GORMLEY* AND RIIONDA G. HARTMAN**
INTRODUCTION
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Rights, which guarantees the people of Kentucky the liberties es-
sential for a democratic society. Kentucky's Bill of Rights,' which
has had an extraordinary history, is eminently worthy of study
because it is the barrier between the powers and prerogatives of
the state and the liberties of the people.
In 1792, Kentucky attained statehood as farmers, planters, and
politicians assembled in Danville for the first constitutional con-
vention. 2 The delegates to the convention drafted and ratified
Kentucky's first permanent constitution in 1792. 3 This document
was modeled after the constitutions of certain leading colonies and,
in many respects, after early English documents such as the Magna
Charta and the English Bill of Rights. Since the adoption, Kentucky
has had three constitutional conventions, in 1799, 1849, and 1891,
to revise the original. 4 Ratified on September 28, 1891, the present
state constitution has remained in force for one hundred years, a
testimonial both to the wisdom of its draftsmen and the vitality of
the people.
5
To discover the full meaning of Kentucky's Bill of Rights, two
hundred years after its ratification, Kentucky's courts and legal
practitioners need full access to its history. This Article demon-
strates that most of the guaranties in Kentucky's Bill of Rights
were adopted from Pennsylvania's 1790 constitution, which in turn
derived from early English documents. Accordingly, both sources,
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 and various early English
documents, should be considered in interpreting Kentucky's Bill of
Rights.
This Article undertakes a section-by-section analysis of the
present Kentucky Bill of Rights, providing a background for per-
sons interested in the history of individual liberties in Kentucky.
First, the Article traces the textual evolution of the Bill of Rights
through Kentucky's four constitutions. Next, selected Kentucky
Supreme Court and Kentucky Court of Appeals decisions are an-
alyzed to provide insight into the courts' interpretation of the
modem Kentucky Bill of Rights, and a framework for future
constitutional development.
I Ky. CONST. §§ 1-26.
2 See generally J. CowARD, KENTUCKY IN THE NEw REPUBLIC 1 (1979).
See id. at 1.
See id. at 1, 22, 124.
For a discussion regarding Kentucky's constitutions, see generally Dietzmann, The
Four Constitutions of Kentucky, 15 Ky. L.J. 116 (1926-27).
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I. ORIGINS OF T=E KENTUCKY BILL OF RIGHTS
When Kentucky separated from Virginia in 1790, the task of
writing the first state constitution was as significant as attaining
statehood. For early Kentuckians, drafting a constitution was crit-
ical to establishing a proper foundation for the state and attracting
educated and talented people to govern it. Unlike the progressive
and established societies of states like Pennsylvania, Massachusetts
and Virginia, Kentucky's population was an amalgam of pioneers
and latecomers. 6 Over half of the citizens hailed from Virginia;
many served in the Revolution, establishing themselves in Kentucky
with military land warrants.7 As a consequence, the Kentucky
society of the late 1700s was so new that Kentuckians saw "none
about them to whom or to whose families they had been accus-
tomed to think themselves inferior. ' 8
Even Kentucky's elite lacked the knowledge and experience in
government needed to write a constitution. Kentucky had "very
few characters who [had] turned their attention to these important
subjects." 9 Political unknowns and Kentucky gentry alike shared a
lack of preparation for the task of drafting a state constitution.
Few had attended college, and none of the new leaders possessed
more than an ordinary English education. 0 The paucity of lawyers,
educated men, and politicians of established reputation led Ken-
tucky's elite to seek assistance from leaders of the eastern states,
most notably Pennsylvania and Virginia."
Between 1785 and 1791, Kentucky gentlemen sent a deluge of
letters, soliciting advice from notables like Thomas Jefferson, jurist
Edmond Pendleton, and lawyer George Nicholas.12 The Kentucki-
ans persistently sought the assistance of James Madison, even
inviting him to write the constitution. His abilities for constitution
drafting were esteemed, and he was reputed to share personal ties
with Kentuckians. 3 Madison, however, declined the invitation, based
on his "[i]gnorance of many local circumstances," that "must be
consulted in such work."'
14
6 See J. CowARD, supra note 2, at 21.
7 Id.
I Id. at 10, 24.
9 Id. at 11.
10 Id. at 11, 21-22.
" Id.





Finally, a convention of 45 delegates met in Danville on April
2, 1792, for a mere 18 days, without Jefferson or Madison. This
convention was led primarily by George Nicholas, who had com-
manded a company of Virginia troops in the Revolutionary War,
served as a member of the Virginia constitutional convention, and
settled on a plantation in Mercer County, near Danville. Nicholas
quickly earned a reputation as a leading statesman. Shortly after
the convention he received an appointment as Kentucky's first
Attorney General.
15
Kentucky folklore suggests that Jefferson secretly penned the
first Kentucky Bill of Rights. 16 This myth has been fostered by the
lack of recorded history concerning the events of the convention.
The official Journal left the proceedings shrouded in mystery. 17
However, research for this Article discloses that the Kentucky Bill
of Rights was not in fact drafted by Thomas Jefferson. A com-
parison of the Kentucky Bill of Rights of 1792 and a number of
earlier, now defunct constitutions of the leading colonies, demon-
strates unequivocally that the original Kentucky Bill of Rights was
borrowed almost verbatim from the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1790.18
History supports this conclusion. Joan Wells Coward, a leading
historian of the Kentucky Constitution, has written that, although
James Madison declined Kentucky's invitation to draft its Consti-
tution, "[H]e recommended a reading of a recently published vol-
ume of state constitutions for materials upon which to draw."' 19 A
letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace, a district court judge,
confirms this recommendation. 20 Although Coward concludes that
," See THE LAWYER AND LAWMAKERS OF KENTUCKY 215-16 (H. Levin ed. 1897).
16 See Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Ky. 1966) ("These words were
supposedly penned by Thomas Jefferson as section 2, Article XII, of the 1792 Constitu-
tion."); see also LEGISLATrVE RESEARCH COMM'N, INFORmATIONAL BuLLETiN No. 29, KEN-
TUCKY'S CONsTrrroNAL DEVELOPMENT 3 (1960) ("This constitution was a brief document
modeled in many respects after the constitution of the United States. In the main it reflected
the thinking exemplified by Jefferson."); I A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE iN THE UNIrED
STATES 444-45 (1950).
'1 See J. COWARD, supra note 2, at 25. The Journal did indicate the contribution of
George Nicholas, by extending formal thanks "for his particular attention to and zealous
and useful assistance in conducting the business while a member of this House." Id.
," For a comparison of the Kentucky Bill of Rights of 1792 and the Pennsylvania Bill
of Rights of 1790, see the Appendix.
"1 J. COWARD, supra note 2, at 11.
10 Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785) noted in J. COWARD,
supra note 2, at 11 n.28.
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"Kentuckians were on their own," ' 2 1 in fact, Nicholas and the other
delegates took Madison's advice seriously, choosing to adopt the
recent Pennsylvania Bill of Rights as their own.
This discovery is not surprising. Most early state constitutions
borrowed heavily from those of leading colonies, particularly Penn-
sylvania, New York, Delaware, and Virginia.2 People like Benja-
min Franklin and Jefferson, who played important roles in drafting
the leading constitutions, were the symbols of American independ-
ence; it was natural to look to them for guidance.
This link in the Kentucky Constitution's history is valuable
because it allows courts and lawyers to trace the provisions of the
Bill of Rights to their earliest origins. In fact, many of the indi-
vidual liberties contained in both the Kentucky and Pennsylvania
Bills of Rights originated in several early English documents. These
documents protected what were considered basic rights of English-
men, which existed in England long before the colonies' independ-
ence .3 The similarity between the rights preserved in both the
English and colonial documents supports the conclusion that the
drafters of early state constitutions relied heavily upon the English
documents. Specifically, an examination of the Kentucky Bill of
Rights of 1792 shows that it may be traced ultimately to the Magna
Charta and the English Bill of Rights.
Before examining the origins of specific provisions of the Ken-
tucky Constitution in more detail, it is important to gain a general
familiarity with the most important English documents that signif-
icantly influenced the constitutional draftsmen of both Pennsyl-
vania and Kentucky. The foremost of these, the Magna Charta,
was adopted in 121524 and safeguarded several rights that were
21 J. CowARD, supra note 2, at 11.
21 See generally W. ADAMs, THE FIRST AM RIaicA CoNSTrrtIMoNs 82, 94 (1980). Dis-
cussing the origins and enactments of the first state constitutions, Adams states that,
[Flor the most part, the North Carolinians did not work out original formu-
lations, particularly in the declaration of rights. Most of the clauses in their
declaration were taken over from Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland....
Mhe citizens of Vermont adopted a constitution and a declaration of rights,
both of which they had taken almost word for word from Pennsylvania.
Id.
See generally E. BuRKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REvOLUTION n' FRANCE (J.G.A.
Rocock ed. 1987). A central theme of Burke's is that the rights of Englishmen, reflected in
the Petition of Right, Magna Charta and the Declaration of Right, are derived from tradition
and are to be transmitted to posterity. Id.
24 See MACNA CHARTA (1215), reprinted in I KY. RFv. STAT. ANN. 839-45 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1988) [hereinafter KRS].
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subsequently guarantied by both the Kentucky and Pennsylvania
Bill of Rights.
The Magna Charta originated the guaranty of freedom of
religion in its first chapter:
[T]he Church of England shall be free, and shall have all her
whole rights and liberties inviolable. (2) We have granted also,
and given to all the freemen of our realm, for us and our heirs
forever, these liberties underwritten, to have and to hold to them
and their heirs, of us and our heirs forever.25
Although the Magna Charta did not expressly bar cruel and
unusual punishment, it stated that, "A freeman shall not be amerced
for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great
fault, after the greatness thereof. "26 Another chapter of the Magna
Charta provided specific compensation for the taking of property,
specifically horses, carts, and timber, by a sheriff or bailiff.2 7
Further, the Magna Charta explicitly required that witnesses for
the accused be heard prior to conviction: "No bailiff from hence-
forth, shall put any man to his law upon his own bare saying,
without credible witnesses to prove it. "28
Another guaranty in the Magna Charta, the right to trial by
jury, was especially significant in the development of English law
because the citizenry had frequently been subjected to punishment
through secret proceedings in the infamous Court of Star Cham-
ber. 29 The Magna Charta stated:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his
freehold or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled,
or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the
law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or
defer to any man, either justice or right? 0
A notable, though seldom employed, provision in Kentucky's
current Bill of Rights may have also originated in the Magna
MAGNA CHARTA, reprinted in 1 KRS, supra note 24, at 839.
26 Id. This chapter also specified limitations on how certain persons, including earls,
barons and men of the church, could be punished. See id.
27 See id. at 842 (eighth chapter). This provision required the person taking property
to pay ten pence a day for a carriage with two horses. See id.
22 Id. at 843 (twenty-eighth chapter).
2' For a discussion of this period and its excesses, see J. GAY, THE COURT OF STAR
CHAMER AND ITS REcORDS TO THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH I (1985).
30 MAGNA CHARTA, reprinted in 1 KRS, supra note 24, at 843 (twenty-ninth chapter).
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Charta. The Kentucky constitutional provision guarantying the in-
herent rights of the people in broad, unspecified terms31 resembles
the Magna Charta provision granting "to all archbishops, bishops,
abbots, priors, earls, barons, and ... all freemen," the liberties
embodied in the Magna Charta.
32
A second major English document influencing the Pennsylvania
and Kentucky Constitutions was the Petition of Right, adopted in
1627 by Parliament. 33 The Petition of Right, enacted during the
reign of King Edward III, entrenched due process in English law,
providing: "[N]o man of what estate or condition that he may be,
should be taken out of his land or tenements, nor taken nor
imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death without being brought
to answer by due process of law."
'34
By requiring that a prisoner be brought before a court within
a specified time to determine if his or her detention was lawful,
the English Habeas Corpus Act35 also influenced the development
of individual rights in Kentucky. The Act also established the
double jeopardy doctrine, as well as the right to a speedy trial.36
The Act was incorporated into the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776, and, in turn, worked its way into the Kentucky Constitution
of 1792.
37
A final influential document was the English Bill of Rights,
enacted in 1689, the first year of the reign of William and Mary. 38
Reaffirming the right to trial by jury and the ban on cruel and
unusual punishment, the English Bill of Rights declared the right
to petition and to freely speak. 39 The right to petition the King,
40
like the right to petition government included in the Kentucky
3" See Ky. CONST. § I ("All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain
inherent and inalienable rights....").
" MAGNA CHARTA, reprinted in I KRS, supra note 24, at 839 (introduction section).
" PETITION OF RIGHT (1627), reprinted in W. McELREATH, A TREATISE OF STATE
CoNsTrrTIONS 196-99 (1912).
34 Id. at 194.
31 The Habeas Corpus Act (1680), reprinted in W. McELREAmT, supra note 33, at
200-08.
6Id. at 200-01.
31 See. Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, §§ 10, 12.
38 See ENGLISH BEL OF RIGHrs (1689), reprinted in W. MCELREATH, supra note 33, at
209-12.
,1 Id. at 212.
0 Id. at 211 ("That it is the right of subjects to petition the King, and all commitments
and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.").
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Constitution of 1792,'41 embodies the fundamental principle that
citizens have a right to request changes in their government. Free-
dom of speech was also guarantied in the English Bill of Rights:
"[Tihe freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in parlia-
ment, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or
place out of parliament.
' 42
Although the liberties embodied in these English documents,
i.e., the Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the English Habeas
Corpus Act and the English Bill of Rights, certainly contributed
to the origin of the Kentucky Bill of Rights, these early English
freedoms have taken on unique meanings in the United States. The
remainder of this Article discusses and analyzes the origin and
evolution of each provision of the Kentucky Bill of Rights43 and
shows how the courts and citizens of Kentucky have molded these
provisions to reflect their own unique political culture.
1I. THE KENTUCKY BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Inherent and Inalienable Rights
§ 1. All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain
inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned:
44
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties.
Second: The right of worshipping Almighty God according to
the dictates of their consciences.
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and
happiness.
Fourth: The right of freely communicating their thoughts and
opinions.
Fifth: The right of acquiring and protecting property.
Sixth: The right of assembling together in a peaceable manner
for their common good, and of applying to those invested with
the power of government for redress of grievances or other proper
purposes, by petition, address of remonstrance.
4 Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 22 ("That the citizens have a right in a peaceable
manner to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those invested with
the powers of government for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition,
address, or remonstrance.").
42 ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS, reprinted in W. McELREATH, supra note 33, at 212.
41 See infra notes 44-635 and accompanying text.
"Ky. CONST. § 1.
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Seventh: The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and
of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to
enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons.
1. Textual Evolution
Section 1 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights affords to all persons
a bundle of protections, combining discrete categories and decla-
rations of rights that have remained virtually unchanged for two
hundred years. The first subsection, intended as a catchall for
"inherent and inalienable" rights, protects basic liberties against
deprivation by the state.45 The free exercise of religion, embodied
in the second subsection, was a basic tenet of Kentucky's ideology,
and grants Kentuckians the right to worship "Almighty God ac-
cording to the dictates of their consciences." Mirroring the free
exercise of religion guaranty in the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1790,46 this provision has been neither narrowed nor altered to the
present. 47
The first section of the Kentucky Bill of Rights, in subsection
four, also embraces freedom of expression, a liberty identical to
the right to express thoughts and opinions freely, as provided by
the 1790 Pennsylvania Bill of Rights.48 By its very terms, this
guaranty reflects Kentucky's commitment to a democratic society
and the notion that the health of a self-governing society is nur-
tured by free speech.
The right to secure property, included in the fifth subsection,
first appeared in Kentucky's third constitution. 49 This inclusion
indicates Kentucky's commitment, born during this period, to the
protection of property.
Section 1, in its sixth paragraph, also safeguards the freedoms
of assembly and petition, making the right to freedom of expression
comprehensive." The Kentucky guaranty certainly was modeled
after the provision guarantying freedom of assembly, set forth in
the 1790 Pennsylvania Bill of Rights.5 1 The drafters of both the
45 Id.
41 See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3. For a comparison of the constitutions see
infra Appendix.
7 Compare KY. CONST. of 1792 art. XII and Ky. CONST. of 1799 art. X and KY.
CONST. of 1850 art. XIII with Ky. CONST. § I.
48 See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7.
9 See KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 3.
10 See KY. CONST. § 1.
"1 See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 20.
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1792 Kentucky Constitution and the 1790 Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion meant this as a broad guaranty by allowing for governmental
reform through "remonstrance." Remonstrance is defined as "[a]
formal protest against the policy or conduct of the government or
of certain officials drawn up and presented by aggrieved citizens."
52
The intended breadth of this liberty is clear, since remonstrance,
i.e., the right to protest against government actions, is discrete
from petition, i.e., the liberty to ask the government to perform
an affirmative act.
Finally, the right to bear arms is expressly provided in the final
paragraph of the first section,-3 reflecting the early American sen-
timent that freedom was born in revolution and won largely by the
private arms of citizens.5 4 Resembling the guaranty provided by
the 1790 Pennsylvania Constitution, this section reflects the Ken-
tucky notion, of the late eighteenth century, that allowing arms in
the hands of the people is one of the safeguards of freedom: "[A]n
armed citizenry exceeds the dubious safety of a disarmed one. '
5
2. Judicial Interpretation
a. "The right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties" 
56
The Kentucky Supreme Court has limited protection to the
right of liberty secured by section 1, at least where it has concerned
the penumbral freedom of association. In Grzyb v. Evans5 7 a
wrongful discharge action was filed against the King's Daughters'
Hospital of Ashland by a former director of housekeeping and
laundry. The employee, a male, had been terminated for fraterniz-
ing with a female hospital employee.58 The employee complained
that his termination violated Kentucky's protection of freedom of
association, guarantied implicitly by section 1, because he was
terminated for associating with another employee. 9
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990).
See Ky. CONST. § 1.
4 Kohrman, Federal Regulation of Small Arms, 29 Ky. B.J., May 1965, at 33, 34.
SS Id. at 34.
Ky. CONST. § 1.
700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985).
See Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 400 (Ky. 1985).
'9 See id. at 401.
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The circuit court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss,
reasoning that the complaint lacked even a passing reference to a
specific constitutional violation. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
reversed, finding, as the employee had argued, a constitutional
right to associate implicit in the personal liberty secured by section
1 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights.6° The Kentucky Supreme Court
reversed this finding. Without expressly addressing the extent to
which the "liberty" of section I might encompass a freedom of
association, the court explained:
[T]he protections afforded Kentucky citizens under Kentucky
Constitution Section I are against transgressions of government
and lawmaking bodies. Thus, although the Court of Appeals
made reference to [the employee's] constitutionally protected rights
of personal liberty, the constitutional protection of freedom of
association does not limit the employer's right to discharge an
employee.
6'
Thus, although the first clause of section 1 may include freedom
of association, Grzyb suggests that such a liberty does not exist
absent state action.
b. "The right of worshiping Almighty God according to the
dictates of their consciences"62
Interestingly, the freedom of exercise provision was drafted
very broadly in the sense that it guarantied the free exercise of
religion to "all men," arguably including slaves and foreigners,
rather than just to "citizens. ' 63 Such all-encompassing language
was unusual, since those persons generally had no protected rights
in Kentucky as of the late eighteenth century.
Interpreting this state constitutional right broadly, the Kentucky
high court ruled in Bush v. Commonwealth64 that excluding a
witness in a criminal case based on a religious belief or disbelief
violated both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. In
Bush the Commonwealth proffered the testimony of C.C. Moore
as a witness in a criminal action over defense counsel's objection
that Moore "was an Atheist," and "did not believe in any God
60 Id. at 401-02.
61 Id. at 402.
KY. CONST. § 1.
63 See Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 3.
m 80 Ky. 244 (1882), rev'd on other grounds, 107 U.S. 110 (1883).
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or future state of rewards and punishments. ' 65 Defense counsel's
objection was based on the common law rule that labelled an
atheist incompetent to testify in court. The trial court overruled
the objection, allowing Moore to testify.
66
On appeal, the court affirmed, declaring that "religious dis-
belief does not disqualify" a witness from testifying. 67 In support
of its affirmance, Judge Hines, writing for the court, invoked the
first amendment of the federal constitution68 and the fifth section
of the 1850 Kentucky Bill of Rights, explaining that:
The object of this provision was to make the divorce between
church and state irrevocable, to establish unequivocally that the
province of government is to deal with the temporal relations and
affairs of men, and in no case with matters spiritual, and that,
under no circumstances, should any burden be placed upon any
one, or any penalty enforced on account of opinion in reference
to religious or spiritual matters. 69
Focusing on the notion that a free society should regulate only the
acts, not the thoughts, of its citizens, the court reasoned:
To apply the rule insisted upon would be to make a religious
test, which is contrary as well to the letter as to the spirit of the
constitution. If the test can be applied in this case, it may be
applied in any, for, independent of this provision of the consti-
tution,there is nothing to prevent the legislature from passing any
law they think proper prescribing particular denominational stan-
dards of belief as a test of competency to give evidence. 70
Judge Hines concluded:
We think that this provision of the constitution not only permits
persons to testify without regard to religious belief or disbelief,
but that it was intended to prevent any inquiry into that belief
for the purpose of affecting credibility. It places the Atheist, in
11 Bush v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 244, 247 (1882), rev'd on other grounds, 107 U.S.
110 (1883).
See id. at 247-48.
67 Id. at 248.
61 The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), extended the protections of the first
amendment to the states, through the fourteenth amendment.
69 Bush, 80 Ky. at 249.
70 Id. at 250. The court further noted, "To proscribe or punish for religious or
political opinions is of the essence of despotism." Id.
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this regard, on the same footing as any other witness, and leaves
the question as to the credibility to be inquired into the same
way.
7 1
Twenty-two years later, in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mayes,7 2 the court cited "the thorough and enlightened" opinion
by Judge Hines in Bush approvingly, finding that a witness in a
civil action may not be cross-examined as to religious belief for
the purpose of discrediting him.
73
Bush and Mayes indicate a broad heritage of religious protec-
tion in Kentucky, under both the first amendment and section 1.
While the import of the "disestablishment" clause of the Kentucky
Bill of Rights parallels the first amendment, the textual differences
between the provisions may provide fertile ground upon which to
recognize religious protections that are uniquely Kentuckian.
c. "The right of freely communicating their thoughts and
opinions" 14
The Kentucky Court of Appeals extended the guaranty of
expression provided by this subsection to commercial speech in
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance v. Louisville Bar Associa-
tion.75 While upholding a declaratory judgment rendered by the
Franklin Circuit Court, to the effect that the Louisville Bar Asso-
ciation could publish the results of its judicial qualification poll
with certain restrictions, by use of an advertisement paid by cor-
porate funds, the court observed that publication of the results and
receipt of the information by the voters were "fundamentally pro-
tected rights" under section 1 of the Kentucky Constitution.76 The
court further explained:
It is well established that paid advertisements, even those involv-
ing "commercial speech" are entitled to first amendment protec-
7 Id. at 251.
80 S.W. 1096 (Ky. 1904).
71 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mayes, 80 S.W. 1096, 1097 (Ky. 1904). In Mayes,
J. H. Mayes, a black preacher, filed an action against W. D. Bell, a conductor for the
defendant company, asserting that Bell uttered vile and profane comments toward him. In
an attempt to discredit his testimony at trial, Mayes' attorney probed Bell's religious beliefs
during cross-examination by asking questions such as "Do you believe in the existence of
a God?" and, "Do you believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ?" See id. at 1096.
74 Ky. CONST. § 1.
75 579 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
76 See Kentucky Registry of Election Fin. v. Louisville Bar Ass'n, 579 S.W.2d 622,
626 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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tion. The protection also extends to the right of the public to
receive information and ideas.
77
However, the Kentucky courts have interpreted the freedom of
expression provision narrowly in cases involving the right to picket
during an illegal strike, and have upheld injunctions against section
1 challenges when the freedom to express one's sentiments is out-
weighed by competing rights of others. For example, in Jefferson
County Teachers Association v. Board of Education,78 school
teachers appealed from an injunction against striking in the public
schools, contending that the court's order violated their right of
free speech and expression.7 9 Finding meritless the teachers' con-
tention, the court ruled that such a right is not absolute, but is
limited "by the countervailing rights of others. ' 80 In support of
its ruling, the court reasoned:
[The injunction] prohibit[ed] the commission of illegal acts, and
the rights of free speech and public assembly do not license
violations of law .... "Where such illegality consists of viola-
tions of settled public policy, . . . the injured party has a right
to be protected from the imminent harmful consequences of such
action."81
d. "The right of acquiring and protecting property"
'82
The Kentucky courts have defined property broadly to include
livelihood and have not been hesitant to strike down laws unduly
regulating professions. Under this subsection, the courts have in-
validated acts prohibiting the use of trading stamps, prescribing
hours of business for barber shops, and confiscating property
through license fees.
In Lawton v. Steward Dry Goods,83 the Kentucky high court
announced that the right of acquiring property carried with it "as
a necessary and inseparable incident, the right to engage in any
" Id. at 626-27 (citations omitted).
11 463 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971).
11 See Jefferson County Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.
1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971).
Io d. at 630.
Id. at 630 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 210 P.2d 305, 309 (1949)).
82 Ky. CONST. § 1.
11 247 S.W. 14 (Ky. 1923).
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business or occupation that is not injurious to the public weal." 84
Accordingly, the court ruled that an act prohibiting the use of
trading stamps in Kentucky could not be sustained because such
legislative action was "fanciful" and, if permitted to its logical
extent, "no business [would] be safe from legislative interfer-
ence. "85 The court observed, in dicta, that the framers of the
Kentucky Bill of Rights recognized
[t]he difference between the savage and the civilized man [which]
is due in no small degree to the fact that the former provides
only for the moment, while the latter provides for the morrow.
Indeed, the ownership of property is always an incentive to good
citizenship, and good citizenship always contributes to good gov-
ernment, and therefore to the welfare and happiness of man.86
Employing a similar analysis in City of Louisville v. Kuhn,
87
the Kentucky high court invalidated a Louisville ordinance that
made conducting "barber business" before 8 a.m. and after 6 p.m.
unlawful. The court decided that
to deny the right of either the barber or of his patrons to render
and receive such services within the reasonable time indicated
would be followed by incalculable inconvenience and detriment
to both the barber and his patrons.88
The court held that the ordinance violated the right to secure
property, finding that its "inhibitive provisions" limited pro tanto
the right of all members of the barber profession to acquire prop-
erty. 9
In Southern Linen Supply Co. v. Hazard,90 Kentucky's highest
court ruled that a city ordinance establishing that. licenses costing
from $200 to $400 were required to operate laundries and linen
services was offensive to the Kentucky Bill of Rights. 91 Likewise,
in City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Shone & Co.,92 the court found
that a Jackson city ordinance requiring restaurants to close for
Lawton v. Steward Dry Goods, 247 S.W. 14, 16 (Ky. 1923).
85 Id.
g Id.
145 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1940).
City of Louisville v. Kuhn, 145 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Ky. 1940).
See id.
151 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1941).
91 See Southern Linen Supply Co. v. Hazard, 151 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Ky. 1941).
178 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1944).
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four hours after midnight was unreasonable, transgressing the dic-
tates of this constitutional provision. 93
In the final analysis, the decisions in Lawton, Kuhn, Hazard
and Jackson all demonstrate Kentucky's unwillingness to allow
state and city governments to encroach unreasonably upon the
property rights of Kentuckians.
e. "The right of assembling together in a peaceable manner for
their common good, and of applying to those invested with the
power of government for redress of grievances or other proper
purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance"94
Although few cases have interpreted this provision of section
1, the right of assembly was closely protected in Boyd v. Deena
Artware, Inc.95 At issue in Boyd was the constitutionality of an
injunction preventing union employees from picketing their em-
ployer's manufacturing plant and warehouse. 96 The court held that
the injunction was unconstitutional, as a violation of the right to
assemble, stating:
Undoubtedly the injunction is clothed in such terms as to prohibit
[the employees] from congregating in large number at or about
[the employer's] plant, although such assembly might be for a
lawful purpose. In this respect, the prohibition is in absolute
violation of Section I (6) of our Constitution.97
Boyd demonstrates the importance of the right to assemble in
Kentucky.
f. "The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the
state, subject to the power of the general assembly to enact laws
to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons" 98
In Bliss v. Commonwealth,99 decided in 1822, the court relied upon
section 23 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights of 1799 to invalidate a
legislative act preventing persons from carrying concealed arms. 100
91 See City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Shore & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ky. 1944).
9" KY. CONST. § 1.
- 239 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1951).
96 See Boyd v. Deena Artware, Inc., 239 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Ky. 1951).
91 See id. at 89.
Ky. CONST. § 1.
12 Ky. 90 (1822).
11 See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90, 91-92 (1822) (interpreting Ky. CONST. of
1799, art. X, § 23).
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Although the act did not "import an entire destruction of the right
of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the
state,"' 01 the court ruled, "it is the right to bear arms in defense
of the citizens and the state, that is secured by the constitution,
and whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that right"
violates the Kentucky Bill of Rights. 10 2 In response to the govern-
ment's position that the act merely operated as a partial restraint
on the right of citizens to bear arms, thereby allowing other forms
of possessing weapons, the court firmly replied:
[I]t is the right entire and complete, as it existed at the adoption
of the constitution; and if any portion of that right be impaired,
immaterial how small the part may be, and immaterial the order
of time at which it be done, it is equally forbidden by the
constitution.
03
The state constitution was changed in 1850 to allow the legis-
lature to prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons.' °4 Still, in
Holland v. Commonwealth,10 5 the court broadly interpreted the
right to bear arms. On appeal, the court reversed a conviction for
carrying a concealed deadly weapon in violation of a state statute
because the defendant was a duly appointed peace officer. 1°6 Char-
acterizing the constitutional provision as an "affirmation of the
faith that all men have the inherent right to arm themselves for
the defense of themselves and of the state,"' °7 the court cited this
section as an exemplification of the broadest expression of the right
to bear arms. 08
B. Absolute Power Does Not Exist in a Republic
§ 2. Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and
property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the
largest majority. 1°9
1o Id. at 91.
'm Id.
103 Id. at 93.
114 See KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25; see also KRS, supra note 24, at § 527.020
(prohibiting the carrying of a concealed deadly weapon).
-05 294 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1956).
-o, See Holland v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1956) (interpreting the
current Kentucky Bill of Rights).
107 Id. at 85.
loa See id.




The guaranty of section 2 was not included in the first Kentucky
Bill of Rights but was added at the 1850 constitutional conven-
tion."0 It originally was intended as a safeguard against deprivation
of the "inherent and inalienable rights" secured by sections 1 and
4.111
Although recognizing the state government's power to regulate,
section 2 prevents that power from being exercised in a capricious
or discriminatory manner, particularly by the legislature. Undoubt-
edly, in the absence of such a provision, the Kentucky courts would
still have the ability to invalidate legislative acts through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal consti-
tution.11 2 However, by expressly including this language in the state
Bill of Rights, the draftsmen of 1850 afforded distinct protection
to the inherent and inalienable rights of the state constitution,
thereby affirming the independent vitality of the Kentucky Bill of
Rights.
2. Judicial Interpretation
Referring to section 2 as the "pole star section ' 113 of the
Kentucky Constitution, the Kentucky Supreme Court has declared:
Section 2 of our Constitution is simple, short and expresses a
view of government and -political philosophy that, in a very real
sense, distinguishes this republic from all other forms of govern-
ment which place little or no emphasis on the rights of individuals
in a society." 4
In a series of decisions the courts of Kentucky have attempted to
delineate which acts of government amount to an abrogation of
the power prohibited by this section. The high court has, for
example, struck down municipal legislation under which the grant-
ing of a permit was left to the unfettered discretion of a city
agency. In Bruner v. City of Danville,1 5 Bruner sought to secure
11 See KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 2.
"' See supra notes 44-106 and accompanying text; infra notes 167-182 and accompa-
nying text.
11 The due process clause guaranties "No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
"I Bruner v. City of Danville, 394 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Ky. 1965).
"1 Kentucky Milk Mktg. & Antimonopoly Comm'n v. Kroger, Co., 691 S.W.2d 893,
899 (Ky. 1985).
Hs 394 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1965).
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a license to conduct dances in Danville. His application was denied
by the city without explanation. The court found that the condi-
tions upon which the city granted or refused permits were so vague
and indefinite that compliance with the requirements could only be
determined by subjective, ad hoc judgments. Such a system was
arbitrary, and thus invalid under section 2 of the Kentucky Con-
stitution. Because Bruner engaged in the public enterprise of dance
promotion,"16 the court stated:
The freedom to engage in a lawful business is no less important,
and indeed it would seem more essential to man's sustenance,
than the liberty to utilize property as he sees fit. Certainly Section
2 of the Constitution applies to both."
7
According to the Kentucky high court, the legislature may not,
under the guise of promoting the public interest, arbitrarily inter-
fere with private business. In Illinois Central R.R. v. Common-
wealth,"8 a railroad company had been convicted of deducting
wages from its employees for time spent voting, which was a
misdemeanor under Kentucky law. The company was fined $100.
The railroad company brought suit, claiming that because 4,849 of
its employees had voted on election day, it would have lost
$11,591.63 if the law were allowed, and that such a wage-payment-
for-voting time provision was antagonistic to the Kentucky Con-
stitution's proscription against the arbitrary exercise of power." 9
On appeal, the court agreed. In refuting the state's contention that
the legislature had a right to adopt the law under its police power
to guard the general welfare, the court struck down the provision
as offensive to section 2, explaining:
[I]t is always appropriate to remember that the police power is
not without its limitations, since clearly it may not unreasonably
invade and violate those private rights which are guarantied under
[the] state constitution. 20
The court, in Illinois Central, further announced that section 2
inhibits the legislative power of this state from arbitrarily passing
a law taking property away from one person and giving it to
116 See Bruner v. City of Danville, 394 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Ky. 1965).
"' Id. at 942.
204 S.W.2d 973 (Ky. 1947), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1948).
"' See Illinois Central R.R. v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 973, 973-74 (Ky. 1947),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1948).
110 Id. at 976.
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another person without value received or without any contractual
basis. And this inhibition still stands, regardless of the merit or
glory or value or need of the person on the receiving end of the
transaction. 121
In 1985, the Kentucky Supreme Court characterized section 2
as "a curb" on the legislature, or any other public official, in the
exercise of political power. At issue in Kentucky Milk Marketing
& Antimonopoly Commission v. Kroger, Co. 122 was the constitu-
tionality of the Kentucky Milk Marketing Law, which prohibited
retailers from selling milk below cost in an effort to prevent mo-
nopolies and unfair practices in the sale of milk and milk prod-
ucts. 123 Determining that the law was a minimum mark-up law,
rather than an anti-monopoly statute, the court found the statute
unconstitutional. In invalidating the Act both on its face and in
its enforcement by the antimonopoly commission, 24 the court de-
clared, "[A]n enactment of such nature is an arbitrary exercise of
power by the General Assembly over the lives and property of free
men."1 25 To support its conclusion that the law at issue was arbi-
trary, the court explained:
Whatever is contrary to democratic ideals, customs and maxims
is arbitrary. Likewise, whatever is essentially unjust and unequal
or exceeds the reasonable and legitimate interests of the people
is arbitrary .... If the action taken rests upon reasons so unsub-
stantial or the consequences are so unjust as to work a hardship,
judicial power may be interposed to protect the rights of persons
adversely affected. Our function is to decide a test of regularity
and legality of a board's action by statutory law and by the
constitutional protection against the exercise of arbitrary official
power.
2 6
The standard enunciated in Kroger has been used by the courts
in analyzing the constitutionality of a variety of state and local
laws. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down the
state's Unfair Trade Practices Act, in 1989, as violative of section
2. In Remote Services, Inc. v. FDR Corp.,127 FDR Corporation
121 Id. at 975.
"2 691 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1985).
113 See id. at 896-97.
,24 See id. at 899-900.
121 See id. at 900.
126 Id. at 899 (citations omitted).
1- 764 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1989).
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filed a complaint alleging that Remote Services had violated the
state antitrust provision by selling gasoline products at less than
cost for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying com-
petition. In response, Remote Services contended that the statute
violated section 2. The trial court agreed, granting summary judg-
ment for Remote Services. ThS Kentucky Court of Appeals re-
versed, reasoning that the act was a mere "trade-practice measure,"
and distinguishing it from the minimum retail mark-up law that
was struck down as unconstitutional in Kroger.128 Reversing this
decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's
grant of summary judgment, ruling that the act offended section
2 of the state Bill of Rights. Unlike the court of appeals, the
supreme court was unable to distinguish Kroger.129 The court rea-
soned that the Act, like the milk marketing law at issue in Kroger,
prohibited sales below cost for anti-competitive purposes, and "re-
quire[d] adherence to essentially the same cost determination for-
mula."' 130 Accordingly, the court determined that the Act was a
fortiori both "facially unconstitutional" and unconstitutional in its
enforcement."'
Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Foley, 32 the Kentucky
Supreme Court struck down a state law that prohibited bribery
and related acts in connection with elections. The court relied on
Kroger to conclude that the election law had been written "so
broad and subject to such a vast array of interpretations" that it
resulted in "an open invitation to arbitrary, retaliatory, selective,
trivial, and therefore unjust criminal prosecution," in violation of
section 2. 13 However, in Thompson v. Fayette County Public
Schools,34 the Kentucky Court of Appeals distinguished Kroger in
holding that a Tates Creek School Board policy, making students
ineligible for interscholastic athletic activities when their grade
point average fell below satisfactory standards, did not offend the
Kentucky Constitution. The court ruled that a policy requiring
school athletes to maintain a 2.0 average is reasonable and not
arbitrary, being
1 See Remote Services, Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Ky. 1989).
'19 See id. at 82.
130 Id.
"I See id. at 83.
"1 798 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1990).
131 Commonwealth v. Foley, 798 S.W.2d 947, 953 (Ky. 1990).
-- 786 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
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designed to minimize outside activities which distract from aca-
demic endeavors while providing incentive to make acceptable
grades so the eligibility may again be retained. This policy does
not in any way exceed the reasonable and legitimate interests of
the school system.'35
Section 2 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights has also been inter-
preted to embrace the traditional concepts of fundamental fairness
and impartiality implicit in both due process and equal protection
jurisprudence. In Standard Oil Co. v. Boone County Board of
Supervisors,'3 6 holders of leasehold interests in real estate located
near an airport and owned by a government agency filed a com-
plaint challenging the tax assessment on their leasehold estates. The
estates of other such leaseholders had been exempted from taxa-
tion. Specifically, they claimed that the taxes were assessed and
levied in such a discriminatory fashion as to violate the Kentucky
Constitution. The Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed. Casting sec-
tion 2 as a bulwark against unreasonable discrimination, 3 7 the
court found that "[w]hen one person is being taxed and another
is not, the sensible and constructive solution is to right the wrong
by filling the omission rather than by adding another wrong."'3 8
The court held that the unequal treatment must amount to a
conscious violation of the principle of uniformity to offend section
2. 139
Lastly, in its recent decision in City of Louisville ex rel. Kuster
v. Milligan,'14 the Kentucky Supreme Court construed section 2 to
prohibit the Civil Service Board from exercising absolute and ar-
bitrary power without being subject to review, either by another
administrative agency or by the courts.'
41
C. Equal Protection
§ 3. All men, when they form a social compact, are equal; and
no grant of exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges
3S Thompson v. Fayette County School Bd., 786 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Ky. Ct. App.
1990).
136 562 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1978).




1- 798 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1990).
'4 See City of Louisville ex rel. Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Ky. 1990).
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shall be made to any man or set of men, except in consideration
of public services; but no property shall be exempt from taxation
except as provided in this Constitution; and every grant of a
franchise, privilege or exemption, shall remain subject to revo-
cation, alteration or amendment.
142
1. Textual Evolution
Equality, in a constitutional sense, generally means that the
government may not treat similarly situated persons in a disparate
manner. The equal protection clause of the present Kentucky Con-
stitution can be traced to the constitution of 1792. That original
provision stated:
That the general, great, and essential principles of liberty and
free government may be recognized and unalterably established,
we declare that all men, when they form a social compact, are
equal, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or
separate public emoluments or privileges from the community but
in consideration of public services.
143
This original provision, though similar to the first sentence of
article IX, section 1 of Pennsylvania's 1790 Constitution, departed
substantially from the Pennsylvania equal protection guaranty,
which declared: "[T]hat all men are born equally free and inde-
pendent."144
Most notably, the original Kentucky provision had given suf-
frage to all men, by intent or accident, including blacks. By 1799,
however, slavery had become more entrenched in Kentucky and a
large majority of the convention delegates favored protection of
the practice. Hence, the convention members carefully narrowed
the broader guaranty to exclude slaves by adding the word "free"
to the preface, so that it read, "[A]Il free men, when they form a
social compact, are equal .... -114 Indeed, it is apparent from the
text of the 1799 provision that the drafters intended to protect and
legitimize slavery. It is, then, ironic that this provision later devel-
oped into Kentucky's equal protection clause, a guaranty of the
,42 Ky. CONST. § 3.
Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 1.
" PA. CONST. of 1790, art. X, § 1.
KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 1.
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In Fischer v. Grieb,147 Kentucky's highest court lauded section
3 as distinguishing Kentucky's government "from governments
based on favoritism," and called its "adoption ... the greatest
forward step in the development of the science of governm"ent.' 48
The court explained that section 3 places "all persons similarly
situated upon a plane of equality under the law, and ... fix[es] it
so that it would be impossible for any class to obtain preferred
treatment, or for those in power to grant governmental favors in
return for political support." 149 While section 3 does not forbid
"classification based on reasonable and natural distinctions,"" 0 the
court stated that it does prohibit classification "so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to impose a burden upon or exclude one or more
of a class without reasonable basis in fact.'
5
1
In cases decided over the past ninety years, the Kentucky courts
have sustained equal protection claims where the state has treated
certain classes of citizens differently from others. For instance, in
Allen v. Board of Education,5 2 two school teachers were involun-
tarily suspended under a policy promulgated by the school board
that required a mandatory leave of absence for all employees of
the board that were political candidates.1 53 The suspended teachers,
who were running for public office, challenged the policy on the
ground that it violated the equal protection provision of the state
constitution. They contended that the classification was not ration-
ally related to the interests sought to be protected. 54 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the school board had not
shown that seeking political office was an activity that hindered
6 See, e.g., Trustees of Graded Free Colored Common Schools v. Trustees of Graded
Free White Common Schools, 203 S.W. 520 (1918) (characterizing section as "equal pro-
tection clause of constitution").
.41 113 S.W. 1139 (Ky. 1938).
141 Fischer v. Grieb, 113 S.W. 1139, 1140 (Ky. 1938).
149 Id.
11 Id. at 1140.
1 Id.
" 584 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
" See Allen v. Board of Education, 584 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
"1 See id. at 409-10.
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teachers in the performance of their duties. 155 In support of its
finding, the court reasoned:
The mandatory leaves of absence were imposed only on those
teachers seeking elective office. Teachers engaged in other time-
consuming activities were not required to take a leave of absence.
There was no showing that political campaigning was the only
activity that would adversely affect the quality of education and
warrant a mandatory leave of absence.
56
Although the equal protection clause of the Kentucky Consti-
tution has been invoked frequently to challenge the constitutionality
of legislation that classifies citizens in other respects, success has
been infrequent. Even when the courts have doubted "the wisdom"
of the legislature, they have been reluctant to find legislation
unconstitutional. For example, in Vincent v. Connecticut,157 the
constitutionality of a policy promulgated by the Kentucky Depart-
ment for Human Resources that provided "caretaker benefits" to
be paid to a "responsible relative" that lived separately from a
"needy and disabled person" but that came into that person's
home to provide services was at issue.15 8 The policy also permitted
services for an individual living in the home of a relative, but only
if it would have been "necessary to hire someone to come into the
home to provide care."' 15 9 June Lee Vincent, who shared her home
with and cared for her disabled mother, challenged the policy,
claiming that it violated the state equal protection guaranty.
1
60
The court of appeals expressly doubted the wisdom of a policy
that provided benefits "to an adult child who visits the home of a
needy parent to care for the parent but denies those. same benefits
to a child who takes the needy parent into her home.' ' 16' However,
the court "perceive[d] some rational basis for the policy," and
therefore determined that the policy did not violate section 3 of
the Kentucky Constitution. 62 For similar reasons, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals has determined that a statute relating to the
revocation of a driver's license upon conviction for drunk driving
," See id. at 410.
:56 Id.
117 593 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
356 See Vincent v. Connecticut, 593 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
159 Id.
16 See id.




that provided potentially harsher penalties for drivers under age
18, did not violate the equal protection provision of the Kentucky
Bill of Rights, 16 because it was rationally based.
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Express Mart, Inc., 64 the
state highway department filed a complaint against Express Mart
for maintaining commercial billboards within view of the interstate
highway, in violation of the Kentucky Billboard Act. Express Mart
responded, asserting that enforcement of the act was impermissibly
selective and therefore violative of Kentucky's guaranty of equal
protection under the laws.1 65 The circuit court ruled in favor of
Express Mart, finding that the act was enforced in an unconstitu-
tional manner because the department had applied the law more
vigorously in wealthier communities.1 66 The court of appeals re-
versed the circuit court, finding "no evidence to support the con-
clusion that the statute was enforced in an unconstitutional
manner."' 67 The court observed that the act was enforced state-
wide, stating that the "mere fact that a higher percentage of legal
actions may be prosecuted in some districts than in others does
not amount to selective enforcement."' 16 The court also stated in
dicta that even if the evidence had supported a finding of unequal
enforcement, there was "no evidence of invidious motive or un-
justifiable classification.' '169
Throughout Kentucky's constitutional history, persons have used
this provision to challenge the government's regulation of business.
Although the courts of Kentucky have occasionally supported such
attacks, the decisions have indicated that this provision offers only
limited protection against the state's police power.
D. Inherent Rights Retained by the People
§ 4. All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace,
safety, happiness and the protection of property. For the ad-
vancement of these ends, they have at all times an inalienable
-6 See Praete v. Commonwealth, 722 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
64 759 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
"61 See Commonwealth v. Express Mart, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
16 See id. at 601-02.
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and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government
in such manner as they may deem proper.'
70
1. Textual Evolution
A similar provision guarantying the sovereign power of the
people was taken verbatim from the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1790 and written into the 1792 Kentucky Constitution, which pro-
vided:
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace,
safety, and happiness. For the advancement of these ends, they
have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter,
reform, or abolish their government in such manner as they may
think proper.' 1
This provision has checked political corruption, limited the power
of the legislature to perpetrate fraud, and encouraged legislative
responsiveness. The language of this provision memorialized the
early experiences of Kentuckians in securing a government under
which they possessed freedom of action not permitted by the
English divine right of nobility. The guaranty has been a permanent
fixture throughout Kentucky's two hundred year constitutional his-
tory.' 72 Indeed, the wording of the provision has remained relatively
unaltered, with the minor exception that the phrase "and the
protection of property" was added to the first sentence in 1850'
73
and "deem proper" displaced "think proper" in 1799.' 74
2. Judicial Interpretation
The doctrine of popular sovereignty, expressed by this section,
was first recognized by the Kentucky high court in 1892. In Miller
v. Johnson, 75 the court stated:
It is conceded by all that the people are the source of all govern-
ment power; and, as the stream cannot rise above its source, so
170 Ky. CONST. § 4.
M KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 2; see also infra Appendix.
,1 Compare Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 2 and KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 2
and KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 4 with KY. CONST. § 4.
M See KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 4.
'7, See KY. CONST. of 1799, art X, § 2.
M 18 S.W. 522 (Ky. 1892).
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
there is not power above them. Sovereignty resides with them,
and they are the supreme law-making power. Indeed, it has been
declared in each of the several constitutions of this state that "all
power is inherent in the people;" and this is true, from the very
nature of our government.
76
In Gatewood v. Matthews,77 W. C. Gatewood and several
other Kentucky residents and taxpayers brought an action to enjoin
the state attorney general and secretary from certifying the question
of adoption of a proposed new constitution. The general assembly
had established a Constitution Revision Assembly to conduct a
detailed study of each section of the Kentucky Constitution and
recommend a draft of a reformed constitution to be published by
two newspapers of general circulation within the state.178 However,
the Kentucky Constitution had established, in sections 256 and 258,
particular modes of amendment or revision to the state constitu-
tion. 179 Gatewood and the other residents claimed that, taken to-
gether, those sections represented "exclusive" modes of changing
the constitution. 180 Before reaching the merits of the claim, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals explained that section 4 represents a
"viable principle of free government," noting that it has never
been a "mere relic" or "museum piece.' 181 Rather, the court
cautioned:
To the contrary, it seems clear to the majority of this Court that
in each of our four constitutions the Bill of Rights has been
purposefully set aside as supreme and inviolate because it repre-
sents those things that are basic and eternal, all other matters
being transitory and subject to change. It follows that nothing
else in the Constitution can be construed as a limitation, restric-
tion or modification of any of these fundamental rights.
82
Concluding that the action taken by the legislature did not violate
the form or spirit of the Kentucky Constitution,183 the court stated:
When the people vote on the proposed Constitution it will be an
expression of the inalienable right of the ultimate sovereign to
376 Miller v. Johnson, 18 S.W. 522, 523 (Ky. 1892).
7 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966).
See Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Ky. 1966).
See id. at 718.
See id.
" Id. at 720.
362 Id. at 720-21.
See id. at 721.
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reform the government. That right is guarantied by Section 4 of
the Bill of Rights, and is not preempted by the inclusion in the
Constitution of alternate modes of revision.18
4
E. Freedom of Conscience
§ 5. No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
sect, society or denomination; nor to any particular creed, mode
of worship or system of ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person
be compelled to attend any place of worship, to contribute to the
erection or maintenance of any such place, or to the salary or
support of any minister of religion; nor shall any man be com-
pelled to send his child to any school to which he may be
conscientiously opposed; and the civil rights, privileges or capac-
ities of no person shall be taken away, or in any wise diminished
or enlarged, on account of his belief or disbelief of any religious
tenet, dogma or teaching. No human authority shall, in any case
whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.'8 5
1. Textual Evolution
The first Kentucky Constitution guarantied to all men the
"right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences. '18 6 It was not until the drafting of the Kentucky
Constitution of 1890, however, that freedom of conscience was
secured in a separate provision.1
87
Freedom of conscience ensures that every person has a right to
believe as his or her conscience dictates. It also protects persons
from being treated differently because of their faith; free exercise
of religion, on the other hand, guaranties the right to practice a
faith without being molested. The purpose of the section's "pref-
erential treatment" language was to prohibit the denial of rights
or privileges because of religious beliefs expressly, and to prevent
state-sanctioned religious establishments or modes of worship. In-
deed, the early constitutional history of Kentucky reflects the no-
tion of disestablishment. Like Pennsylvania, the newly born
Commonwealth of Kentucky did not have an established religion.1 88
1S Id. at 721-22.
Ky. CONST. § 5.
Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 3.
7 Compare Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 5 with KY. CONST. § 5.
"I See L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS 169, 174, 192 (1972).
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Article XII, section 3 of the 1792 Kentucky Constitution was
modeled after the provision in the Pennsylvania Constitutions of
1776 and 1790.189 Both the Kentucky and Pennsylvania provisions
stated:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences;
that no man of right can be compelled to attend, erect, or support
any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his
consent; that no human authority can in any case whatever con-
trol or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no pref-
erence shall ever be given by law to any religious societies or
modes of worship.'90
The only differences between the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790
and the Kentucky Constitution of 1792 were the replacement of
"establishments" by "societies," and the omission of some com-
mas. 191
Although the provisions in the Kentucky and Pennsylvania
Constitutions were virtually identical, the notion of disestablish-
ment reflected divergent meanings in the different regions. The
most significant difference between Kentucky and Pennsylvania was
that the former was still predominantly a frontier community. By
contrast, Pennsylvania was a relatively old region, with diverse but
strongly entrenched religious groups. Based on a sufficiently strong
Christian consensus, Pennsylvania included in its otherwise radical
1776 constitution an oath for legislators to pledge their belief "in
One God, the creator and governor of the universe," and acknowl-
edged "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given
by Divine inspiration."' 192 By 1790, this provision was reduced to
one allowing disqualification for not "acknowledg[ing] the being
of a God and a future state of rewards and punishments."'' 93
By contrast, Kentucky's sentiment was aiti-clerical, as evi-
denced by the state constitutional prohibition against clergy in the
legislature and the governor's mansion. 94 Even the largest religious
group, the Baptists, adamantly opposed any establishment, having
been dissenters both in the northern Congregationalist and southern
"I See infra Appendix.
110 KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 3; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3.
191 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3.
192 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 10.
1' PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 4.
194 See KY. CONST. of 1799, art. II, § 26, art. III, § 6.
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Anglican colonies. Not until the Great Revival, at the turn of the
nineteenth century, was religion a frontier influence. 95 It is not
surprising, then, that since 1792, Kentucky's constitution has in-
sisted "[t]hat the civil rights, privileges, and capacities of any




It was not until the late nineteenth century that Kentucky's
high court expressly construed the language warranting that "the
civil rights, privileges, or capacities of any citizen shall in no wise
be diminished or enlarged on account of his religion.' ' 97 In BusA
v. Commonwealth, decided in 1882, the Court explained:
It is a declaration of absolute equality, which is violated when
one class of citizens is held to have the civil capacity to testify in
a court of justice because they entertain a certain opinion in
regard to religion, while another class is denied to possess that
capacity because they do not conform to the prescribed belief. 9 '
Holding that this section of the Kentucky Bill of Rights invalidated
the common law rule that established the incompetency of an
atheist to testify in a judicial proceeding, the Court reasoned
further:
[A]n Atheist may testify in any case where property rights are in
issue in a civil proceeding, and to deny the Commonwealth or
the accused the same testimony when life or liberty is at stake
presents an anomaly that is repugnant to every sense of justice. 99
Like the cases dealing with free exercise of religion under section
1,200 section 5 consistently has been interpreted to forbid govern-
ment endorsement of religion in any fashion. Generally, these
provisions have been found to limit the government's power to
restrain the distribution of religious literature in public. For ex-
91 See N.H. SoNN, LmaERA. KENTUCKY (1939); H. WISH, SocmrY AND THoUGHT IN
EARLY AMERICA 248-50 (1950).
19 Compare KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 4 and Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 4
and Ky. CONsT. of 1850, art. XIII, § 6 with KY. CONST. § 5.
9 Bush, 80 Ky. at 244; see also Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437 (1942)
(commenting on rarity of establishment cases).
M Bush, 80 Ky. at 249-50.
"9 Id. at 251.
See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
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ample, in Seevers v. City of Somerset,20' the court held that an
ordinance prohibiting persons from distributing literature without
a permit was unconstitutional. Anne Seevers, an ordained Jeho-
vah's Witness minister, was prosecuted for distributing religious
literature in Somerset. Reversing her conviction, the court ruled
that the ordinance ran afoul of the guaranties of free religious
exercise in both the state and federal constitutions. 202 The court
relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Murdock
v. Pennsylvania,23 which held that a person distributing religious
literature was engaged in religious, not commercial, activity and,
therefore, any ordinance preventing this activity was unconstitu-
tional.2 4
Since the decision in Seevers, the Kentucky court has found
that the rights secured by sections 1 and 5 may, on occasion, yield
to countervailing concerns for public safety. For example, at issue
in Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health20 5 was the constitu-
tionality of a school board's resolution to require all schoolchildren
to be vaccinated for smallpox, or be excluded from the city schools.
In Mosier, parents of two schoolchildren sought to enjoin enforce-
ment of the resolution, contending that there was no reasonable
apprehension of a smallpox epidemic and that the compulsory
vaccination interfered with their right to exercise their religion
freely; their religion prohibited the injection of foreign substances
into the veins of the childrenY.0 The court, in affirming the trial
court's refusal to enjoin enforcement of the resolution, held that
while there could be no interference with the parents' religious
beliefs concerning vaccination, those beliefs could not be permitted
to endanger the health of the community by preventing children
from being vaccinated against smallpox.20 7 The court explained:
[R]eligious freedom embraces two conceptions, "Freedom to be-
lieve and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature
of things, the second cannot be. . . ." One may have any religious
belief desired, but one's conduct remains subject to regulation
for the protection of society.2°
20, 175 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1943).
- See Seevers v. City of Somerset, 175 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1943).
23 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
104 See Seevers, 175 S.W.2d at 19 (citing Murdock, 319 U.S. at 116-17).
-' 215 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1948).
See Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health, 215 S.W.2d 967, 967-68 (Ky. 1948).
See id. at 969.
21 Id. (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)) (citing Cartwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
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Recognizing that freedom of religion necessarily must yield, at
times, to the concern for public welfare, the court observed that
the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom "does not permit
the practice of religious rites dangerous or detrimental to the lives,
safety or health of the participants or to the public. ' ' 20 9
Although the Kentucky courts repeatedly have demonstrated
willingness to enforce the freedom of conscience provision, it has
steadfastly refused to find that the wearing of religious attire by
Roman Catholic nuns, while teaching in the Kentucky public
schools, violates the constitutional guaranty of free exercise of
religion: "[The] garb does not teach ... the woman within
teaches. ' 210 In Rawlings v. Butler,211 the court found that nuns
teaching in public schools, attired in traditional wear, neither at-
tempted to force their religious views on pupils nor taught "relig-
ion" in the public schools. 212 Rather, the court reasoned that the
singular fact that the nuns had taken religious vows to the Catholic
faith could
not deprive them of their right to teach in public schools, so long
as they do not inject religion or the dogma of their church....
The dress of the Sisters denotes modesty, unworldliness and an
unselfish life. No mere significance or insignificance of garb can
conceal a teacher's character. Her daily life would either exalt or
make obnoxious the sectarian belief of a teacher.
213
The courts of Kentucky also have interpreted section 5 as not
prohibiting the allocation of state funds to non-profit hospitals
that are open to all faiths without preference. In Kentucky Building
Commission v. Effron,214 the Kentucky high court tracked the
historical underpinnings of section 5, explaining:
The framers of the Kentucky Constitution, in writing § 5 into
our Bill of rights ... followed closely the Federal Constitution.
w9 Id.
230 Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Ky. 1956).
21, 290 S.W.2d 801 (1956). In Rawlings, a class action was instituted on behalf of
taxpayers from Casey, Marion, Washington, Nelson, Meade, and Grayson counties, con-
testing the expenditure of public money to pay the salaries of Roman Catholic nuns that
taught in the public schools of these counties while wearing "religious garb and ... symbols
of their religion." See id. at 802.
232 See id. at 804 ("The religious views of these Sisters and their mode of dress are
entirely personal to them.").
213 Id.
21- 220 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1949).
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It was their evidence purpose ... to build "a wall of separation
between Church and State" which had been so firmly erected in
the Federal Constitution. Manifestly, the drafters of our Consti-
tution did not intend to go so far as to prevent a public benefit,
like a hospital in which the followers of all faiths and creeds are
admitted, from receiving State aid merely because it was originally
founded by a certain denomination whose members now serve on
its board of trustees.
21 5
Upholding a Kentucky law that authorized the allocation of public
funds to privately owned hospitals, the court stated that such
"social legislation" was intended to aid charitable institutions in
caring for the afflicted and allow the state to assume the burden
of operating hospitals as a public service to its citizens.1 6 Although
these hospitals were charitable organizations sponsored and oper-
ated by religious sects, the court reasoned that it was never the
intent of the framers of section 5 to prevent the state from aiding
an institution that rendered public service "merely because the
governing body of the institution is composed of one denomina-
tion. '217
In sum, the Kentucky courts have utilized both sections I and
5 to prevent the government from encroaching on the boundary
between church and state. For example, the freedom of conscience
provision of section 5 has been used to prevent removal of persons
from their professional positions because of their religious be-
liefs.2 18 The courts have found that freedbm of religion may some-
times prevent the government from enacting otherwise reasonable
regulations to advance state interests.
F. Free and Equal Electorate
§ 6. All elections shall be free and equal.
21 9
1. Textual Evolution
The right to participate in free and equal elections has always
been considered a fundamental right in Kentucky. 2 0 It is not sur-
215 Kentucky Bldg. Comm'n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky. 1949).
216 See id.
217 Id.
218 See Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Ky. 1956).
219 Ky. CONST. § 6.
22 See Phelps, About the Making of Kentucky's Constitution, 10 Ky. B.J. 132, 133
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prising, therefore, to find that the right of all citizens to exercise
an equal vote was guarantied in the first Kentucky Bill of Rights:
"That elections shall be free and equal."''221 This guaranty was
modeled after the provision ensuring free and equal elections in
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. 222 Except for the stylistic
change of dropping the word "That," the provision in the present
constitution is the same as it was in 1792.
223
2. Judicial Interpretation
In Robertson v. Hopkins County,224 Kentucky's highest court
defined the requirement that elections be "free and equal" as
meaning that all regulations of the election franchise should be
uniform and impartial. In Robertson, a state statute provided that
the school superintendent be elected by the voters of the county,
but voters in first, second, third; and fourth class cities would be
ineligible to vote. As a result, voters in the Madisonville school
district that resided within the corporate limits of Madisonville had
no voice in the selection of the superintendent. Voters that lived
in the same school district, but outside of Madisonville's corporate
limits, could vote.22-
Determining that the law discriminated between voters, and
finding the election regulation unconstitutional, the Kentucky court
expressly relied upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
in Winston v. Moore:
226
Section 6 of our Constitution declares that all elections shall be
free and equal .... [S]uch a declaration means "that the voter
shall not be physically restrained in the exercise of his right of
franchise, by either civil or military authority, and that every
voter shall have the same right as any other voter.' ' 227
(1946). Lilburn Phelps states that this section of the Bill of Rights was accepted by the
people of Kentucky without question. Phelps also discusses the constitution of 1891, par-
ticularly the events surrounding the constitutional convention of 1890, to which his father
was a delegate. See id.
"I KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 5.
See infra Appendix.
223 Compare Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 5 with Ky. CONST. § 6.
56 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1933).
See Robertson v. Hopkins County, 56 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Ky. 1933).
91 A. 520 (Pa. 1915).




The court in Robertson further emphasized that all regulations of
the election franchise must be "reasonable, uniform and impar-
tial.,,22
The Kentucky courts have likewise held that an election during
which a substantial number of voters were precluded from casting
votes because they did not receive ballots violated the Kentucky
Bill of Rights. In Wallbrecht v. Ingram,229 the constitutional valid-
ity of an election was contested on the ground that three precincts
in the county at issue had not been furnished with a sufficient
number of ballots to permit all voters an opportunity to vote.no
In Wallbrecht, the issue was whether a Bell County election was
"free and equal" within the meaning of section 6 of the Kentucky
Constitution.231 In ruling that it was not, the court discussed the
purpose of this constitutional provision:
Strictly speaking, a free and equal election is an election at which
every person entitled to vote may do so if he desires, although,
in dealing with the practical aspect of elections,it could hardly be
said that, if only a few were prevented from voting, the election
would not be free and equal, in the constitutional sense. The very
purpose of elections is to obtain a full, fair, and free expression
of the popular will upon the matter, whatever it may be, sub-
mitted to the people for their approval or rejection; and when
any substantial number of legal voters are, from any cause, denied
the right to vote, the election is not free and equal, in the meaning
of the Constitution.
232
The court chose to interpret the guaranty of a free and equal
election to all Kentuckians liberally, declaring that section 6 "ad-
mits of no evasions or exceptions" and explaining that not even
good intentions "can be allowed to defeat its purpose or its mean-
ing. ' ' 233 Even absent a finding of fraud or wrongdoing, 234 the court
held that section 6 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights was "manda-
tory," applying to all elections. Therefore, the provision was vio-
lated when any substantial number of persons are denied their right
to vote.2 15
Id. (quoting 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUToNAL LMITATION 1310 (8th ed. 1927)); see
also Crockett v. Olive, 56 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1933) (companion case).
175 S.W. 1022 (Ky. 1915).
See Wallbrecht v. Ingram, 175 S.W. 1022, 1026 (Ky. 1915).
2' See id. at 1026.
232 Id.
23 Id. at 1027.
See id.
25 See id. at 1026-27.
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The right to "free and equal" elections applies to all general,
but not primary, elections.23 6 Also, Kentucky courts have held that
neither voting machines nor absentee voting interfere with this
constitutional guaranty.23 7 In Grauman v. Jefferson County Fiscal
Court,23 8 voters of Jefferson County contested the constitutional
validity of the Kentucky Voting Machines Act, urging that where
machines were not used in all precincts of the county, the election
was not free and equal. 23 9 Upholding the constitutional validity of
the act, the Kentucky high court found that a vote cast by machine
"has the same force as one cast by hand," and provided neither
advantage nor disadvantage to particular voters. 240 Recognizing that
"there is no more opportunity for fraud," simply because one has
cast a vote by machine,41 the court reasoned that section 6 is
violated only "when the same opportunity for voting is not given
to all persons entitled to the ballot, or when the right of franchise
is restrained by civil or military authority.''242
One year after its decision in Grauman, the court decided
Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O'Connell, 3 which upheld the
validity of a Kentucky law authorizing absentee voting in presiden-
tial and congressional elections by qualified voters. The purpose
of the law was to provide the men and women of Kentucky that
were serving in the armed forces during World War II a means of
voting in those elections.24 Several voters challenged the law, claim-
ing that it violated section 5 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights because
it provided no method of registering absentee ballots on voting
machines, which had been installed in some precincts, and thus
required those ballots to be deposited in regular ballot boxes. 245
Without much discussion, the court found "nothing in the state
constitution [that] prohibited the use of a 'regular ballot box' for
the deposit of 'absentee ballots' in precincts where voting machines
were employed." 24 In support of its finding, the court reasoned
236 See Davis v. Stahl, 154 S.W.2d 736, 737 (Ky. 1941); see also Hodge v. Bryan, 148
S.W. 21 (Ky. 1912).
117 See Grauman v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 171 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1943).
28 171 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1943).
39 See id. at 36-37.
See id. at 37.
' See id.
242 Id.
-3 181 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1944).
I" See Commonwealth ex reL Dummit v. O'Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Ky. 1944).
2,S See id.
I, d. at 696.
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simply: "[A] broad interpretation of the Act would require that
the county official charged with the duty of furnishing ballot boxes
in the other precincts should likewise furnish ballot boxes for the
deposit of absentee ballots in precincts where voting machines are
installed.' '247
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Foley,248 the Kentucky
Supreme Court held a law prohibiting bribery and related acts in
connection with elections violative of section 6. The court deter-
mined that it would not be unreasonable to interpret the law to
prohibit the use of money to influence voters, an interpretation
that would be "repugnant to the concept of free elections. '249
Elaborating on the meaning of the right secured by section 6 of
the Kentucky Bill of Rights, the court stated:
Among the most fundamental of constitutional rights is the right
of citizens to involve themselves in the election process. Through-
out Kentucky, thousands of citizens undertake support of candi-
dates and parties and devote their time and money to the causes
they support. Criminal statutes written in broad general terms
and capable of arbitrary and selective enforcement threaten to
undermine the willingness of such persons to get involved. No
person in his right mind would risk inadvertent violation or
arbitrary enforcement and trust only in a reasonable application
of the statute. 2
0
The court further cautioned that such a law would likely result in
the disenfranchisement of many citizens, resulting in "an infringe-
ment of their rights under Section 6 of the Constitution of Ken-
tucky. "21
G. Right to Trial by Jury
§ 7. The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and
the right thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications
as may be authorized by this Constitution. 25 2
2A7 Id.
- 798 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1990).
2149 Commonwealth v. Foley, 798 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1990).
2 0 Id. at 953.
251 Id.
2 Ky. CONST. § 7.
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1. Textual Evolution
Kentuckians long have attached great significance to the right
to trial by jury. A provision guarantying that right can be found
in article XII, section 6 of the 1792 Kentucky Constitution, which
is identical to article IX, section 6 of Pennsylvania's 1790 Consti-
tution .2 3 The original provision stated: "That trial by jury shall
be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate. ' 25 4 The
guaranty remained virtually unchanged until 1850, when it was
qualified with the phrase "subject to such modifications" as au-
thorized by the state constitution.2 5 This qualification seemed to
limit the right to its pre-1850 definition, blocking any judicial
broadening or constricting of the liberty.
2. Judicial Interpretation
The Kentucky courts have protected the right to trial by jury
carefully. In construing section 7, the court in Johnson v.
Holbrook5 6 held that the "ancient mode" of jury trial refers to
the right of trial by jury as it existed under the practice of the
territory prior to the adoption of its first constitution. 25 7 In support
of this construction of section 7, the court expressly stated: "A
defendant is entitled to a jury trial only upon those common-law
matters as to which a jury trial existed in 1791.' 258
Safeguarding the traditional trial by jury right, the court in
Branham v. Commonwealth,259 refused to permit a defendant to
agree to a trial by only seven jurors. Two years later in Jackson
v. Commonwealth,260 the court reversed a felony conviction by
eleven jurors, stating: "[Tihis court ... has committed itself to
the doctrine ... that [a] defendant cannot waive his constitutional
right of trial by the ancient mode of trial by jury under felony
charges." ' 261 Indeed, the Kentucky courts have found, especially in
felony cases, that waiver of the right to jury trial is impermissible.
21 See infra Appendix.
Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 6.
21 KY. CoNsT. of 1850, art. XIII, § 8.
256 302 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1957).
21 See Johnson v. Holbrook, 302 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1957).
258 Id.
29 273 S.W. 489 (Ky. 1925).
299 S.W. 983 (Ky. 1927) (later overruled by Short v. Commonwealth, 519 S.W.2d
828, 833 (Ky. 1975)).
16 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W. 983, 984 (Ky. 1927).
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In a number of cases interpreting section 7 of the Kentucky Con-
stitution, the court originally prohibited a waiver by the defendant
of his right to a jury in a felony trial. The court expressly stated,
in Allison v. Gray,262 that "[t]he protection of the right" to trial
by jury is so secure "that one accused of a felony may not waive
it. ' '261 In Meyer v. Commonwealth,264 the court refused to allow a
defendant that plead not guilty to a charge of "wilful murder" to
waive his right to a jury trial.265 However, the Kentucky courts
have treated misdemeanors differently, finding that although a
defendant in a misdemeanor trial "is entitled to 12 jurors," he or
she "may agree to a lesser number or waive any number or all of
the jurors. "266
As shown above, initially Kentucky courts were strong defend-
ers of the right to trial by jury. This stance was softened consid-
erably in Short v. Commonwealth.267 In Short, the court held that
a defendant may waive a jury trial, declaring that "current consti-
tutional safeguards are so comprehensive that there remains no
further necessity for the rule that an accused may not waive a jury
trial. ' 268 The court overturned the line of precedent established by
Branham, Jackson, Allison and Meyer, adding: "[T]here is nothing
in the Kentucky Constitution which denies an accused the right to
waive a jury trial. '269
Furthermore, the Kentucky high court has rejected a literal
interpretation of the right to trial by jury, determining that neither
the qualifications of jurors nor the manner of their selection is
controlled by section 7. In Wendling v. Commonwealth,270 the court
explained that section 7 "does not attempt to regulate the manner
in which jurors shall be selected or the qualifications they must
possess, nor does it describe or designate the character or class of
persons who must compose a jury." 271
Overall, the Kentucky courts have been consistent in their
interpretation of the jury provision in the state constitution. Al-
2 296 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. 1956) (later overruled by Short, 519 S.W.2d 828).
263 Allison v. Gray, 296 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Ky. 1956) (citations omitted).
- 472 s.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1971) (later overruled by Short, 519 S.W.2d 828).
- See Meyer v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1971).
Phipps v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W. 651 (Ky. 1924).
- 519 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1975).
s Id. at 832.
269 Id.
-0 137 S.W. 205 (Ky. 1911).
"I Wendling v. Commonwealth, 137 S.W. 205, 207 (Ky. 1911).
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though finding that a jury trial is not always necessary, the courts
have been careful to protect the right when it is constitutionally
required.
H. Liberty of Speech and Freedom of the Press
§ 8. Printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes
to examine the proceedings of the General Assembly or any
branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain
the right thereof. Every person may freely and fully speak, write




One of the most closely guarded rights in Kentucky's early
constitutional history was the freedom of expression. Because Ken-
tuckians in the 1700s typically expressed their opinions through
letters and newspapers, a narrow provision guarantying freedom
of the press might have sufficed. However, the drafters of the state
constitution included a broader clause that distinctly protected a
more comprehensive right of expression. At the same time, the
original clause contained a limitation common to many early state
constitutions: citizens were "responsible for the abuse of that lib-
erty. ' 273 The original version of the freedom of speech and press
provision read:
That the printing press shall be free to every person who under-
takes to examine the proceedings of the legislature or any branch
of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the
right thereof. The free communications of thoughts and opinions
is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may
freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty.
The "freedom of thought and opinion" language was deleted
from the provision in 1891, and "citizen" was changed to "per-
son. '274 Interestingly, the clause has specified, since 1792, that "no
Ky. CONST. § 8.
Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 7.
See Ky. CONST. § 8.
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law" restricting these rights could be enacted.27 5 The inclusion of
this language apparently made it easier for the courts to exercise
judicial review of legislation challenged under this section.
2. Judicial Interpretation
Like the rights of free speech and press protected by the first
amendment,276 which have been said to enjoy a special position in
the hierarchy of rights, 277 section 8 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights
has been treated preferentially. Kentucky courts have broadly in-
terpreted the free speech and press provision of the Kentucky
Constitution, at least when the courts have found that these free-
doms are not being abused. In Riley v. Lee,278 one of the first
opinions interpreting this clause, the court found that freedom of
expression is abused if a person maliciously publishes a falsehood
about another:
[I]t is the publication that is the gravamen of the action.... The
citizen may, in what he honestly believes to be in the interest of
morals and good order, and the suppression of immorality and
disorder, criticize the acts of other individuals. So may the press.
But in no case has the citizen the right to injure the rights of
others, among the most sacred of which is the right to good
name and fame. Their rights are absolute as his, and neither can
injure the rights of the other. 279
Expansively interpreting the abuse proviso in the free speech pro-
vision, the court held false speech outside of the constitution's
protection. Further, the constitution was construed as not protect-
ing a defendant that maliciously published an article to damage
the plaintiff's reputation.
20
In Musselman v. Commonwealth,281 a Kentucky statute prohib-
iting "an offensively coarse utterance ' ' 22 was held unconstitutional
275 Compare Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 7 and KY. CoNsT. of 1799, art. X, § 7
and KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 9 with Ky. CONST. § 8.
"I The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
27 See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNsartimuoNAL LAW § 16.2 (3d ed.
1986).
-8 11 S.W. 713 (Ky. 1889).
" Riley v. Lee, 11 S.W. 713, 714-15 (Ky. 1889).
28 See id. at 715.
281 705 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1986).
282 KRS, supra note 24, at § 525.070(l)(b).
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under section 8 of the Kentucky Constitution. In Musselman, a
police officer stopped a vehicle, which had been speeding, driven
by William Musselman. After being stopped, Musselman directed
a diatribe of profanities toward the officer. The officer arrested
Musselman for harassment by vulgar language, an offense under
Kentucky law, which provided in pertinent part: "A person is
guilty of harassment when with the intent to harass, annoy or
alarm another person he ... [i]n a public place, makes an offen-
sively coarse utterance, gesture or display, or addresses abusive
language to any person present." 23 Musselman was convicted of
the offense in the trial court and appealed, contending that the
statute was impermissibly broad and imposed an undue restriction
on the constitutional guaranty of free speech. The court of appeals
disagreed and affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the statute
could be construed as "limited in its application to situations where
the 'offensively coarse utterance' or abusive language amounts to
'fighting words' which have a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is ad-
dressed. ' ' 2 4- The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, finding the
statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 285 Characterizing
the abusive nature of the comments uttered by Musselman as
"deplorable, '28 6 and carefully noting that nothing in the opinion
"should be construed as approving Musselman's abusive utter-
ances, ' 2 8 7 the court criticized the legislature for not expressly aim-
ing the language of the statute toward prohibiting only "fighting
words or words which have a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence. "2 1
In Commonwealth v. Ashcraft,219 the court of appeals struck
down a statute that prohibited any person from upbraiding, in-
sulting, or abusing any teacher of the public schools in the presence
of a pupil. Ed Ashcraft, who was charged with violating this
statute, urged that the complaint against him be dismissed, con-
tending that the statute violated the state constitution. The court
agreed with Ashcraft, ruling that the statute was unconstitutionally
2I Musselman v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d 476, 477 (Ky. 1986) (quoting
§ 525.070(1)(b)).
2" Id. at 477.
See id. at 478.
"' Id. at 477.
Id. at 478.
2S Id.
- 691 S.W.2d 229 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (construing KRS, supra note 24, at § 161.190).
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAl[
vague and overbroad in violation of the freedom of expression
guarantied in section 8 of the Kentucky Constitution. 290 The court
determined that Ashcraft's comments were protected speech, how-
ever "annoying and insulting" they were to the school teacher a.2 9
The court also found that the statutory terms "upbraid, insult,
and abuse" did not sufficiently inform a person of what actions
were prohibited and, therefore, were vague and overbroad. The
court observed: "[O]ne man's gross indignity might be another's
cup of tea.
'292
The Kentucky courts have delineated some limitations, but
generally have interpreted the free speech and press provision of
the Kentucky Constitution broadly. This trend may become increas-
ingly important. The United States Supreme Court, as well as other
federal courts, have been limiting the scope of protection offered
by the first amendment. 293 If speech is to be as fully protected in
the future as in the past, the state constitution may have to play
an increased role.
L Libel
§ 9. In prosecution for the publication of papers investigating the
official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or where
the matter published is proper for public information, the truth
thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libel
the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts,
under the direction of the court, as in other cases. 294
1. Textual Evolution
This section was included in the original Kentucky Bill of Rights
as article XII, section 8.295 Although this section was drafted iden-
tically to the provision incorporated in article IX, section 7 of the
See Commonwealth v. Ashcraft, 691 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
291 See id. at 231-32.
2 Id. at 23 1.
29 See, e.g., California v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theatre, 454 U.S. 90 (1981)
(holding that city not required to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" the obscenity of
motion pictures); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1975) (holding zoning
ordinance prohibiting adult theaters from being near other adult theaters or residential areas
not a violation of the first amendment).
294 KY. CONST. § 9.
19 See Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 8.
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1790 Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, 2 96 it has its roots in the English
"Fox's Libel Act," which provided a safeguard in seditious libel
prosecutions by turning the issue of guilt over to the jury, who
could bring in a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. As a result
of the Act, no judge could direct the jury to find a person guilty
of seditious libel merely on proof of the publications. 297 Similarly,
section 9 was intended to prevent restraints on publications, reflect-
ing the strong Kentucky commitment to free speech and expression.
With a minor grammatical exception, this provision has remained
intact during Kentucky's constitutional history. 298
2. Judicial Interpretation
In Walston v. Commonwealth2 99 the Kentucky high court re-
fused to construe the language of this section providing that "the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under
the direction of the court," to prevent the court "from instructing
the jury as to the law of the case or even directing their verdict.' '0
The court reasoned:
In prosecutions for libel, as in all other cases, it is the duty of
the court to instruct the jury as to the law of the case, and it is
the duty of the jury to accept the instructions of the court as the
law of the case; but, if they disregard them and acquit the
defendant on an issue of fact, the court could not for that reason
grant a new trial. 301
J. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
§ 10. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure; and no
warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize any person or
thing, without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. 0 2
See infra Appendix.
11 See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 23, 35 (1941); J. STEPHEN, A
HIsToRY oF THE CmNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 340-49 (1882).
m Compare KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 8 and Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 8
and Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 10 with KY. CONST. § 9.
' 106 S.W. 224 (Ky. 1907).
SWaston v. Commonwealth, 106 S.W. 224, 226 (Ky. 1907).
301 Id.




This guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure may be
traced to article XII, section 9 of Kentucky's Constitution of 1792,
and article IX, section 8 of Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1790.
The original section provided:
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and
that no warrant to search any place and to seize any person or
things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be,
nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
33
Other than minor grammatical changes, this provision remains
unchanged in Kentucky's present constitution.
2. Judicial Interpretation
The right to privacy is the underpinning of both the warrant
and reasonableness clauses of the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution, 304 and necessarily section 10. Commonwealth
v. Johnson0 5 is exemplary. In Johnson, Charles David Johnson
had been convicted of illegal drug possession, and possession of a
handgun by a convicted felon. At trial, the state introduced drugs,
drug paraphernalia, and a handgun that had been uncovered by
police officers. These items were discovered by the officers while
questioning Johnson outside his motel room. The officers shone a
flashlight through a door left ajar and observed the drug para-
phernalia and a white powder substdnce. Based upon this obser-
vation, the officers then shined the flashlight beam through a
window and saw a handgun underneath the bed. The officers
arrested Johnson, and after obtaining a search warrant, retrieved
the drug paraphernalia, cocaine, and handgun.
The trial court denied Johnson's motion to suppress the evi-
dence, deciding that the search was made incident to a lawful
10, KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 9.
- The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoN s. amend. IV.
"1 777 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1989).
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arrest. The appeals court reversed, holding that the act of shining
a flashlight beam into the hotel room amounted to a warrantless
search in violation of Johnson's privacy rights, as announced in
section 10 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights. Affirming the judgment
of the court of appeals, the Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed
the state's contention that the police had acted to safeguard their
personal safety, finding "mere apprehension for personal safety
and the opportunity such provides for pretext," insufficient to
create an exception to the warrant requirement. 306 The court re-
mained unpersuaded that the police officers were authorized to
observe continuously until the suspect was placed under tie antic-
ipated arrest. 3° The court reasoned: "[I]f such an intrusion were
permitted upon the basis of generalized police safety considera-
tions, the police would be authorized to engage in forced, war-
rantless searches in a multitude of otherwise prohibited
circumstances. 30 8 Although recognizing the legitimacy of the of-
ficers' concern for their personal safety, the court expressly refused
to carve out an exception to section 10: "This court and other
courts have willingly found exceptions to various constitutional
provisions to better insure the safety of police officers. We are not
willing, however, to recognize exceptions so broad as to render
meaningless the right secured by the Constitution of Kentucky. 
°9
Indeed, the courts of Kentucky have strictly enforced the guar-
anty against unreasonable search and seizure. As a result, convic-
tions for crimes have frequently been reversed. In Lane v.
Commonwealth,310 Cecil Lane was arrested for a traffic offense.
Subsequent to the arrest, law enforcement officers searched his
vehicle, finding seven cases of whiskey in the rear luggage com-
partment. Lane was tried and convicted of violating a local-option
law in a dry territory. 31' The appeals court reversed the conviction,
finding that the contraband liquor was obtained as a result of an
unreasonable search. 31 2 The court held that any such articles, dis-
covered as fruit of the warrantless search, were inadmissible. 313
"I See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 777 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Ky. 1989).
"7 Id.
308 Id.
30 Id. (citations omitted).
M 386 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1964).
"I See Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743, 744-45 (Ky. 1964).
312 See id. at 746-47.
M See id. at 745-46.
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A valid warrant is based on probable cause, which is effectively
established when sufficient facts are set forth in the affidavit upon
which the warrant is issued. 314 In Shelton v. Commonwealth,315 the
warrant and supporting affidavit failed to state facts establishing
probable cause. The appeals court reversed a conviction for drug
possession because the affidavit and warrant authorizing the search
of a briefcase did not state that the briefcase contained cocaine.
316
Kentucky courts, in accordance with section 10, have held that
Kentucky's proscription against unreasonable search and seizure
requires that the place to be searched must be described "as nearly
as may be. 3 1 7 In Commonwealth v. Appleby,38 the court ex-
plained: "Our constitution requires a description of such certainty
as to reasonably identify the premises to be searched, and to enable
the magistrate issuing the warrant to determine that the property
to be searched is within his jurisdiction. 31 9
Demonstrating the protective thrust of section 10, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for possession of a con-
trolled substance in Johantgen v. Commonwealth.320 A warrant had
been issued for the search of Daryl Driver, his residence, and "any
other person believed to be involved in the illegal use of, possession
of, or trafficking in controlled substances.' '321 The police arrived
at the premises shortly before Driver, and searched Johantgen. The
police officers found in Johantgen's front pants pocket a packet
of heroin. Johantgen was subsequently convicted of possession of
a controlled substance. Reversing Johantgen's conviction on ap-
peal, the court emphasized that the state constitution required
specificity in describing the person and property to be searched.3 22
Since the supporting affidavit had referred only to Driver, the
court found the warrant defective because neither the warrant nor
the affidavit contained a "recitation of facts indicating that any
other person other than Driver occupied the premises, was present
on the premises when probable cause arose, nor was there any
3, W. LAFAVE & P. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3 (1985).
3,1 766 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1989).
3,6 See Shelton v. Commonwealth, 766 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Ky. 1989).
", Commonwealth v. Appleby, 586 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1978); see Ky. CONST. § 10.
3, 586 S.W. 2d 266 (Ky. 1978).
3,9 Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
310 571 S.W.2d 110 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
"I, Johantgen v. Commonwealth, 571 S.W.2d 110, Ill (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
32 See id. at 112.
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description of persons whose identity was known or unknown to
the affiant."1
32
The Kentucky Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Roocker v. Commonwealth.324 There, a circuit judge issued a search
warrant based on an affidavit presented by a county sheriff. At
the hearing on a motion to suppress the evidence obtained under
the warrant, the issuing judge admitted that he had not read the
affidavit before issuing the warrant. Consequently, the court held
that the search was in violation of both the Kentucky and United
States Constitutions, stating:
Part of the protection of the Fourth Amendment consists of
requiring that inferences in determining probable cause be drawn
by a neutral and detached issuing authority instead of the police
or government agents. Where a judge issues a search warrant
based upon an affidavit which he does not read, he makes no
determination of probable cause but merely serves as a rubber
stamp for the police. Such action is improper even though the
affidavit actually shows probable cause.
325
In other cases, however, Kentucky courts have retreated from
a hard-line position, stating that the Kentucky Constitution "only
prohibits unreasonable searches.... ,,32 In DeBerry v. Common-
wealth,327 the court held that a person may be detained during an
investigatory stop while police officers obtain information about
the person and his vehicle by checking the serial numbers on his
tires against a record of the serial numbers of reported stolen
tires. 32
In Scillion v. Commonwealth,329 the court upheld the warrant-
less search of an automobile. In that case, a police officer stopped
an automobile driven by Mike Cornwell and arrested him for
driving without a license. The passenger, Scillion, was also arrested
for permitting an unlicensed driver to operate his car. The auto-
323 Id.
114 508 S.W.2d 570 (Ky. 1974).
"I Rooker v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Ky. 1974) (citations omitted). Not
only was the warrant in Rooker issued in violation of both the state and federal constitutions,
but it also appeared to have violated Ky. R. CRim. P. 2.04.
116DeBerry v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Ky. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
918 (1974) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1 (1968)).
327 500 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
M See DeBerry v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Ky. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 918 (1974).
3- 508 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1974).
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mobile had been registered in the name of Scillion's wife. After
both men stepped out of the auto and were searched by the officer,
the officer noticed a leather glove protruding from under the seat
of the car. He then searched the car, discovering incriminating
evidence related to a burglary.330 Although the appeals court upheld
the search as reasonable, the justification for the warrantless search
was less than clear. Without much discussion, the court stated that
if an officer has probable cause to arrest the occupants of an
automobile, "he may place him or them under arrest and may
forthwith proceed to search the automobile incident to the ar-
rest."1331 Thus, not all interpretations of section 10 have worked to
the favor of the accused.
Kentucky courts have also held that items in plain view can be
seized by officers that are rightfully at a location. In Jones v.
Commonwealth,332 the court stated that "it is proper to seize stolen
or contraband property" in plain view, even though the items "are
not described in the warrant. ' 333 Additionally, in Cloar v. Com-
monwealth,334 the court upheld the seizure of a stolen motorcycle
cover to support the defendant's conviction for receiving stolen
goods, and wanton endangerment. 335 The court reasoned that a
seizure is lawful if a police officer is "lawfully engaged" in an
activity in a particular place and inadvertently observes an object,
in plain view, "that he had probable cause to associate with crim-
inal activity.' '336 The court expressly found that "such a seizure is
not infirm" under the Kentucky Constitution.
3 7
K. Rights of the Accused
§ 11. In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause
of the accusation against him; to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
330 See Scillion v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 307, 307-08 (Ky. 1974).
311 Id. at 308 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Ky. 1971)).
332 416 S.W.2d 342 (Ky. 1967).
13 Jones v. Commonwealth, 416 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Ky. 1967).
679 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
13" See Cloar v. Commonwealth, 679 S.W.2d 827, 828-31 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
336 Id. at 830.
13 Id. See also Basham v. Commonwealth, 675 S.W.2d 376, 384 (Ky. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1984) (holding that the "mere act of examining property in plain
view while on a lawful search and copying down serial numbers does not constitute an
unreasonable seizure").
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favor. He cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself,
nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by
the judgment of his peers or the law of the land; and in prose-
cutions by indictment or information, he shall have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; but the General
Assembly may provide by a general law for a change of venue
in such prosecutions for both the defendant and the Common-
wealth, the change to be made to the most convenient county in
which a fair trial can be obtained.338
1. Textual Evolution
Section 11 announces the substantive and procedural guaranties
afforded to persons accused of crimes and applies exclusively to
criminal cases and public prosecutions. 339 Similar to provisions of
Pennsylvania 3 and other state constitutions, section 11 of the
Kentucky Bill of Rights sets forth a broad range of rights protecting
criminal suspects, including the right to legal representation, the
right to confrontation with the concomitant right to cross-examine
witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a
speedy and public trial, and the right to be tried before an impartial
jury in the county where the crime was committed.
2. Judicial Interpretation
a. Representation
Since 1821, Kentucky courts have recognized that the accused
has "the right to be heard by himself and counsel. ' ' 341 This right
of representation has been the topic of several opinions by Ken-
tucky courts. Among other things, these opinions teach that the
right to self-representation is not absolute, but that a criminal
38 KY. CONST. § 11.
'1, See Harrison v. Chiles, 13 Ky. (3 Litt.) 194, 196-97 (1823).
See infra Appendix.
4' See Olds v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 465, 467 (1821). William Olds'
billiard table was listed for taxation. When Olds failed to turn over the table to the state,
it sought to fine and trebly tax Olds, as well as to prosecute him for failing to enter the
table for taxation. When Olds' motion to dismiss the prosecution was rejected, he moved
for a continuance on the ground that he sold the billiard table to Hawkins and, therefore,
it should be listed for taxation as Hawkins' property. Because Olds and his counsel were
not permitted to argue the issue, the case was reversed. See Olds v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky.
(3 A.K. Marsh.) 465, 465-68 (1821).
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defendant has the right "to proceed to trial without counsel being
in any way associated with him.''342
Once counsel has been appointed, an accused is not entitled to
represent himself. An accused is entitled to have counsel present,
"especially when [a] verdict is received" at trial, because the ac-
cused in an criminal case is typically "inexperienced. ,343 In Wilcher
v. Commonwealth,344 the appeals court reversed a rape conviction,
holding:
This court has consistently ruled that the provision of our Bill of
Rights to the effect that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
has the right to be heard by himself and counsel means that the
accused has the right to have his counsel present at each stage of
the trial. 45
Once adversary proceedings have begun, an accused is entitled
to assistance of counsel, but only during "critical" stages. 346 Ken-
tucky courts have held that neither arraignment347 nor pronounce-
ment of sentence348 are critical stages triggering the protections of
section 11. The court has reasoned that counsel is only required to
be present "where substantial rights of a criminally accused may
be affected. ,3
49
In Cane v. Commonwealth,3 50 the court determined that the
presence of counsel is not required at preindictment identification
procedures. Henry Thomas Cane, along with two accomplices,
robbed a lady's clothing store while attired in women's clothing.
A store clerk, who had been held at knifepoint by Cane during
the robbery, identified his photograph from a book of mug shots
on the morning of Cane's trial. 351 Cane contended that he was
denied his right to representation because his attorney was not
342 Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Ky. 1974). Eight months after the Kentucky
Supreme Court's decision in Wake, the Supreme Court decided Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 835 (1975), holding that a state may not deny a defendant the right to conduct
his own defense if his waiver was "knowing and intelligent."
341 Wilcher v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1944).
- 178 S.W.2d 949, 949 (Ky. 1944).
34 Id. at 950-51.
3" See Collins v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Ky. 1968).
347 See id.
34 See McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Ky. 1963).
34 Collins, 433 S.W.2d at 665.
3- 556 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978).
31 See Cane v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 902, 905-06 (Ky. 1977), cert. denied, 437
U.S. 906 (1978).
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present when the book was shown to the witness. The court felt
that the defendant's constitutional right to representation did not
include the right to have counsel present when witnesses are inter-
viewed by the state's attorneys, even if such interviews occur on
the day of trial and include an examination of photographs for
identification purposes.3 52 Concluding that the right to representa-
tion guarantied by section 11 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights "is
no greater than the right of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, 3 53 the court stated
that the right to cross-examine the witness was sufficient protection
for the criminal defendant.
3 54
b. Confrontation and Cross-examination
Like its sixth amendment counterpart, 355 the right to confron-
tation in Kentucky assures the opportunity to cross-examine op-
posing witnesses. In Hughes v. Commonwealth,356 the Kentucky
Supreme Court reversed a conviction for first degree robbery be-
cause the trial court had admitted the hearsay testimony of a police
officer, implicating the defendant in the robbery. 357 The court
stated that the defendant was convicted by a statement of an
unknown person,
[W]ithout any showing of the reliability of the statement and
without any opportunity of the [accused] to cross-examine the
person who allegedly implicated him in the crime. This is precisely
the situation which the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and Section 11 of the
Kentucky Constitution were designed to prevent. 358
Recently interpreting the right to confrontation liberally, the
court, in Dean v. Commonwealth,359 held that the right of the
352 See id. at 906.
... Id.; see Ashcraft v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1972) (applying the
holding of the United States Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), to
find that the presence of counsel is not required at a pre-indictment lineup).
'5, See Cane, 556 S.W.2d at 906.
'" The sixth amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
" 730 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1987).
37 See Hughes v. Commonwealth, 730 S.W.2d 934, 934 (Ky. 1987).
313 Id. at 934-35.
"1 777 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1989).
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criminally accused to be present and confront is personal; thus,
only the accused may waive it. 60 In Dean, a threshold issue was
whether Roy Wayne Dean, who had been charged with first degree
burglary, rape, and murder, was competent to stand trial. Prior to
trial, a videotaped deposition of the psychiatrist that had examined
Dean was taken. During the deposition, the psychiatrist testified
not only that Dean was competent to stand trial, but that he was
criminally responsible for illegal activity that occurred during the
burglary. 6' He also concluded that Dean had malingered during a
recent evaluation for the purpose of avoiding criminal prosecu-
tion.3 62 Although Dean was absent during the deposition, the dep-
osition was admitted into evidence against him. Dean was convicted
of all charges and sentenced to death.163 On appeal, Dean argued
that his absence at the deposition had violated his right to con-
frontation.
The Commonwealth took the position that Dean's constitu-
tional right had been waived, both by Dean's absence and by his
attorney's actions, and that Dean had failed to demonstrate any
prejudice against him.364 The Kentucky Supreme Court agreed with
Dean, characterizing the right to confrontation as "personal to the
accused under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. ' 365 The
court further held that the accused can waive this right only with
"conscious intent. ' 366 Refusing to construe Dean's absence during
the deposition as a waiver of this constitutional right, the court
concluded that deposing the psychiatrist in Dean's absence violated
the Kentucky Bill of Rights.
367
c. Privilege against Self-incrimination
As early as 1839, Kentucky had recognized the well established
idea "that no one is bound to make answer to, or discovery of,
any matter which may subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or
expose him to infamous punishment. ' 368 Indeed, it has long been
a maxim of Kentucky law that no person shall be compelled to
3- See Dean v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1989).
16, See id. at 901.
10 See id.
3 See id.




Atterberry v. Knox & McKee, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 282, 284 (1839).
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incriminate himself. In Kindt v. Murphy,369 the court explained
that the privilege against self-incrimination
was founded upon no statute but upon general acquiescence of
the courts in a popular demand; and the maxim, which was a
mere rule of evidence in England, has assumed the form of
constitutional or statutory enactments in this country which have
long been regarded as safeguards of civil liberty and as sacred
and important as the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
any of the other fundamental guaranties for the protection of
personal rights.
370
Although the privilege against self-incrimination guarantied by
section 11 applies both to criminal and civil proceedings, 371 it has
been held to protect only against "compulsory" self-incrimination,
not against "voluntary" self-incrimination. 372 In Turner v. Com-
monwealth,373 the court rejected the argument that receipt of an
out-of-court admission made by the accused violated his constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination.37 4 The defendant, who
was accused of murder, testified that he had shot the victim,
allegedly approaching with an axe, in self-defense. 375 During cross-
examination, the prosecutor introduced evidence of an admission
made by the defendant that belied the defendant's contention of
self-defense. 376 Without discussion, the court stated that although
the constitutional privilege meant that an accused could not be
compelled to give testimony against himself, it did "not cover the
case where the accused voluntarily makes admissions in or out of
court.' '377
A more significant aspect of the self-incrimination provision
relates to a defendant's choice not to testify. Because defendants
in criminal cases are protected from compelled self-incrimination
by section 11, as well as by the fifth amendment of the United
3- 227 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1950).
370 Kindt v. Murphy, 227 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Ky. 1950).
37 See Akers v. Fuller, 228 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Ky. 1950). But see Cooper v. Keyes, 54
S.W.2d 933, 936 (Ky. 1932) (noting that provision applies only to evidence that may subject
witness to criminal prosecution, not to evidence that may be used against witness in a civil
action).
,7 See Gentry v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W. 1040 (Ky. 1926).
-" 13 S.W.2d 533 (Ky. 1929).
31, See Turner v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Ky. 1929).
3 See id. at 533-34.
376 See id. at 534.
" Id. at 535.
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States Constitution,3 78 the prosecutor is prohibited from comment-
ing at trial on a defendant's failure to testify.
379
d. Speedy Trial
As early as 1903, Kentucky had recognized that the guaranties
declared in this section of the Kentucky Constitution "are for the
protection of the citizen, and no rule of practice, however ancient
or sacred, should deprive him of them. ' 380 In Jones v. Common-
wealth,38' Hiram Jones was indicted for the murder of a train
conductor. He was accused of placing obstructions on a railroad
track, derailing an engine operated by the victim. 382 When Jones
appeared for trial, the commonwealth's attorney announced that
the state was not ready to try the case and moved to discharge the
witnesses and file the indictment away, reserving the right to re-
instate it. Jones objected, demanding to be tried. The court denied
Jones' demand. 38 3 Reversing this judgment, the Kentucky high
court declared that by refusing to try Jones, and by allowing the
commonwealth to redocket the case, the trial court had denied the
defendant the right to a speedy trial under section 11. The court
reasoned that to conclude otherwise would allow the state's attor-
ney to renew the prosecution at any time, while Jones stood pow-
erless, however innocent he might be, "under a grave charge





The right to a "public trial" in the Kentucky Constitution, like
the guaranty of a public trial in the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution, is a right personal to the accused a.38  In Lex-
ington Herald-Leader Co. v. Meigs,316 Sherman Wright was on trial
"I' The fifth amendment provides: "[N]o person.., shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
179 Cf. Commonwealth v. McClanahan, 155 S.W. 1131, 1133 (Ky. 1913) (holding
involuntary confessions are inadmissible); KRS, supra note 24, at § 421.225 (Supp. 1990)
(defendant's failure to testify shall not be commented upon nor create a presumption against
him).
o Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 S.W. 643, 644 (Ky. 1903).
71 S.W. 643 (Ky. 1903).
3 See id. at 643.
See id. at 643.
114 Id. at 644.
181 Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Meigs, 660 S.W.2d 658, 662 n.1 (Ky. 1983).
3" 660 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1983)
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for murder and faced a possible death penalty. The case generated
substantial publicity. In response, the judge excluded the media
from voir dire of prospective jurors.3 87 The media sought a writ of
prohibition against the judge to compel openness of the voir dire
procedure. The Kentucky Court of Appeals denied this request and
the media appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court.388 At issue
before the court was whether the press could be excluded when the
accused, charged with a capital offense, requested individual voir
dire of veniremen. The court, faced with a public trial/free press
dilemma, found that it was constitutionally permissible for the
judge to grant limited closure during voir dire. The court ruled
that a trial court may bar members of the press "only when
necessary for protection" of the defendant's rights and abstained
from erecting "a series of hoops for the trial court to jump through
on the way to its decision.' '389
The high court, in Beauchamp v. Cahill,39° carved out an ex-
press exception to the guaranty of a public trial by protecting a
child witness from "morbid, prurient, curious and sensation-seek-
ing persons" in the courtroom. 391 The court reasoned that such a
limited exception is permitted "in the exercise of reasonable and
sound discretion" by a trial judge and is not offensive to section
11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
392
f. Impartial Jury
Though seldom successful, the most frequently litigated "im-
partial jury" issues are those relating to the exercise of juror
challenges in criminal cases. While Kentucky courts have accorded
heightened protection to the array of rights expressly guarantied
by section 11, they have not given a liberal interpretation to the
"impartial jury" clause. Hicks v. Commonwealth393 is exemplary.
Christopher Lynn Hicks was convicted of first degree wanton
endangerment and complicity to second degree arson for the burn-
ing of the Club Cabana in Paducah, Kentucky.394 Hicks alleged
3 See id. at 660.
See id.
311 Id. at 664-65.
390 180 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. 1944).
39, Beauchamp v. Cahill, 180 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Ky. 1944).
392 See id.
3 805 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
34 See Hicks v. Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
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seven assignments of error, including that the trial judge violated
his right to an impartial jury. Specifically, Hicks argued that even
after exercising his peremptory challenges to strike jurors that were
biased against him, three of the jurors empaneled were prejudiced
against him. Hicks asserted that the trial judge erred by not re-
moving those jurors for cause. 395 Although unpersuaded by Hicks'
assertion, the court stated unequivocally that in every criminal
matter the accused has a constitutional right to be tried by an
impartial and unbiased jury. The court observed: "[I]t is vital in
a criminal prosecution that any and all doubts as to the competency
of a juror be resolved in favor of the defendant.' '396 Yet, the court
held that Hicks had failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by the trial judge's refusal to strike. 397
g. Venue
The right to be tried in the county where the crime was com-
mitted makes venue an essential element of any criminal charge.
In Parks v. Commonwealth,398 the court reversed a conviction for
malicious shooting and wounding because the commonwealth had
failed to prove venue. Specifically, the court found that the evi-
dence adduced by the state showing that the defendant operated
the Red Bud Tavern near Peterman Hill, coupled with the defen-
dant's testimony that he lived at the foot of England Hill, four
miles from the tavern, and that he had resided in Boyd County
for approximately six weeks, was insufficient to show that the
offense was committed in that county. The court stated that: "The
necessity of proving that the crime for which the accused is being
tried was committed within the jurisdiction of the court is not
merely a matter of form. It is the constitutional right of the
accused. .... ,.399
However, Kentucky courts have interpreted the venue require-
ment narrowly when a criminal defendant fails to object timely to
a court's transfer of a case to another county. In Sturgill v.
Commonwealth,4°° the trial court transferred the case because it
was unable to empanel jurors from the venire that had been sum-
395 See id.
396 Id. at 146-47.
391 See id. at 147.
398 156 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1941).
3" Parks v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Ky. 1941).
516 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1974).
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moned from the county. On appeal, Sturgill argued that the court's
action violated section 11. The appeals court reasoned that the
defendant's failure to object within a reasonable time, despite
adequate opportunity to do so, was inexcusable, 4°1 stating:
Although venue in a criminal action is the subject of constitu-
tional concern under the provisions of Section 11 of the Consti-
tution of Kentucky, it does not rise to the proportions of due
process and fundamental fairness in this case. It really does not
directly touch the determination of innocence or guilt.
°2
L. Charge of Crime
§ 12. No person, for an indictable offense, shall be proceeded
against criminally by information, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger, or by leave of court for oppression
or misdemeanor in office.4°
1. Textual Evolution
The "charge of crime" provision of the Kentucky Bill of Rights
was taken directly from the 1790 Pennsylvania Bill of Rights. 4
The Kentucky provision first provided:
That no person shall, for any indictable offence, be proceeded
against criminally by information, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in
time of war or public danger, or, by leave of the court for
oppression or misdemeanor in office.405
The language was altered in 1799, however, to omit the qualifica-
tion "or misdemeanor in office." Although the minutes of the
committee that drafted the Kentucky Bill of Rights for the 1799
Constitution are preserved, those records do not indicate why the
qualification was then deleted.
-1 Sturgill v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1974) (noting defendant's
failure to object to change of venue until first day of trial).
4a Id.
•, Ky. CONST. § 12.
41 See infra Appendix.
"I Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 12.




In 1879, the Kentucky high court determined that betting on
an election was neither a crime nor an indictable offense within
the meaning of this provision. In that case, Commonwealth v.
Avery,w the commonwealth instituted a civil action against Samuel
Avery to recover $10,000, which Avery won when he bet on the
1875 Louisville mayoral election. A statute authorizing the state to
proceed directed that the proceeds of the wager be forfeited to the
state.4°8 Avery contended that this statutory provision violated then
article XIII, section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution.4 The court
rejected Avery's contention, finding that a forfeiture of the pro-
ceeds from Avery's wager did not constitute criminal prosecution
or an indictable offense within the meaning of the Kentucky con-
stitution.410 The court stated: "[B]etting on an election was never
a crime or an indictable offense at common law, nor is the offense,
as prescribed by the statute, to be visited with any infamous
punishment, and it does not therefore come within the meaning of
the 12th and 13th sections of the Constitution .... ,411
M. Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy
§ 13. No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in
jeopardy of his life or limb, nor shall any man's property be
taken or applied to public use without the consent of his repre-




The Kentucky Bill of Rights historically has focused on pro-
tecting the individual from the powers of the state. A constitutional
guaranty against double jeopardy advances that purpose and was
included in the Kentucky Constitution of 1792. This provision was
identical to the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Con-
40 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 625 (1879).
' Commonwealth v. Avery, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 625, 629 (1879).
Compare Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 13 with KY. CONST. § 12 (sections are
virtually identical).
410 See Avery, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) at 639.
411 Id. at 639-40.
412 Ky. CONST. § 13,
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stitution of 1790. That clause provided: "No person shall, for the
same offence, be twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb.
413
Although there have been several revisions to the Kentucky Bill
of Rights since 1792, the wording of the double jeopardy clause
has remained precisely the same for two hundred years. 414 In fact,
both Kentucky and Pennsylvania have chosen not to modify the
clause since the original drafts, despite changes in other states. In
1865 Georgia added the qualifying phrase, "save on his or her own
motion for a new trial after conviction, or in case of mistrial.
'41 5
Such a qualifying clause has a dual purpose. First, it seems to
prevent a person from appealing a conviction and, in case of
reversal, claiming that he or she could not be tried again because
of the right against double jeopardy. Second, it seems to prevent
a defendant from avoiding retrial after a mistrial caused by the
state. Although Kentucky's current constitution does not expressly
place such a limitation on a defendant, the courts of Kentucky,
through judicial interpretation, have done so.416
2. Judicial Interpretation
The courts of Kentucky generally have been liberal in deter-
mining when a person has been placed in double jeopardy. In
Williams v. Commonwealth,4 7 the defendant pleaded not guilty to
grand larceny. The commonwealth's attorney, after hearing the
evidence, moved to dismiss. The trial court sustained this motion.
Subsequently, an identical indictment was returned, except the
name of the owner of the stolen property was changed. 418 The
defendant contended that he had been acquitted of the charge and
that he had once been placed in jeopardy. 4 9 Rejecting the defen-
dant's contention, the trial court convicted the defendant and
sentenced him to two years in prison. Reversing the judgment of
the lower court, the appeals court discussed in detail the meaning
of the state constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Relying on similar guaranties contained in the Pennsylvania Con-
4" PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 10; see also infra Appendix.
41 Compare KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 12 and KY. CoNsT. of 1799, art. X, § 11
and Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 14 with Ky. CONST. § 13.
4" GA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 9.
416 See Nichols v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. 1983) (holding that a retrial
is not precluded by mistrial due to jury's failure to reach consensus).
78 Ky. 93 (1879).




stitution, the court reiterated the view of the early American col-
onies:
A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial before a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon indictment or information
which is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction,
and a jury has been charged with his deliverance. And a jury is
said to be thus charged when they have been empaneled and
sworn. 4
20
Adopting this view as the rule in Kentucky, the court further
explained that the doctrine of double jeopardy "rests upon the
principle that no man shall be put in peril of legal penalties more
than once upon the same accusation." ' 421 Quoting from early Eng-
lish documents that "no one can be twice punished for the same
crime or misdemeanor," the court explained that the language of
Kentucky's double jeopardy provision
literally construed, limits the constitutional protection to "jeop-
ardy of life or limb," which, according to a familiar rule of
construction, should not be extended to embrace a case where
liberty only is at stake. To thus narrow it, however, would leave
the legislative power at liberty to authorize, in cases where the
punishment is confinement in the penitentiary, a re-trial on the
same charge, after the accused is once tried and acquitted or
convicted, for there is no other provision of the constitution that
can be construed to interdict a re-trial or to sanction the pleas of
former conviction and former acquittal. 422
The court in Williams determined that the defendant could not be
held to answer on a new indictment for the same offense, 423 because
a contrary determination "would be at war with every sense of
justice, subversive of civil government, and contrary to the whole
theory of our institutions.' '424 The court concluded: "There is
nothing better settled in the jurisprudence of England or America
than that no one can be twice tried for the same offense."
'42
1
The scope of the double jeopardy provision in the Kentucky
Constitution turns upon the meaning of the term "same offense."
410 Id. at 96.
2 I Id. at 98.
,12 Id. at 96-97.
"I See id. at 100.
424 Id. at 97.
425 Id.
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In Gaskins v. Commonwealth,426 the court reversed a murder con-
viction, finding that the trial court erred in not sustaining the
defendant's demurrer, because he had been acquitted of the same
offense in a prior proceeding. 427 The court reasoned:
Having been put upon his trial on charge of murder by a jury
sworn to decide the issue between the Commonwealth and him-
self, defendant was entitled to a decision of that issue, which he
could not have been arbitrarily deprived of by the court. On the
contrary, there was a decision by the jury, who, after hearing
evidence and under instructions of the court, rendered in due
form a verdict of not guilty.
42
The Kentucky court has likewise ruled that the state may not
split a single criminal act into separate offenses because a convic-
tion or acquittal on one charge bars a subsequent prosecution for
the offense in any of its degrees. In Arnett v. Commonwealth,429
the court interpreted the "same offense" language of section 13
of the current Kentucky Constitution to signify "the same criminal
act or omission, ' 430 not the degree of the criminal act or omis-
sion. 431 The court explained that the commonwealth must try the
defendant either upon the lower or higher offense into which it
may be divisible, admonishing that "it must elect at its peril,"
because a judgment on the merits to the lesser included offense
shall constitute "a bar to any future prosecution for the higher
degree. '432
Kentucky courts have also found that a defendant is protected
from a subsequent prosecution for an offense when a trial court
erroneously directs an acquittal. 433 Similarly, the court in Hardy v.
Commonwealth434 reversed a conviction for unlawful possession of
spirituous liquors, finding that if an acquittal of an offense in a
police court did not bar a second trial for the same offense in a
circuit court, it would result "in a second trial for the same
30 S.W. 1017 (Ky. 1895).
See Gaskins v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W. 1017, 1017-18 (Ky. 1895).
411 Id. at 1018.
-- 109 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1937).
43 Arnett v. Commonwealth, 109 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Ky. 1937).
"1 See id.
432 Id. at 796; see also Commonwealth v. Gill, 90 S.W. 605, 606 (Ky. 1906) (holding
that a conviction for breach of the peace precluded subsequent prosecution on the same
facts for assault and battery).
4 See Commonwealth v. Little, 131 S.W. 387 (Ky. 1910).
-- 254 S.W. 900 (Ky. 1923).
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offense," which is "prohibited under Section 13 of our Constitu-
tion." 435
Over forty years later, in Commonwealth v. Mullins,436 the
court found that "an accused person has been placed in jeopardy
after a jury has returned a verdict of not guilty," concluding that
section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibited retrial of an
accused that had been acquitted by a directed verdict. 437 Quoting
from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Green v.
United States,438 and echoing the Kentucky Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Williams, the court denied it an essential principle of
criminal law "that the [g]overnment cannot secure a new trial by
means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear to be
erroneous."
43 9
Indeed, the high court has gone so far as to hold that an
acquittal based on improper grounds bars further prosecution. In
Commonwealth v. Ball,"" the trial court, on motion of the defen-
dant, instructed the jury to find the defendant not guilty. Although
the appeals court acknowledged that the trial court erred in the
motion because it lacked jurisdiction, it ruled that any acquittal,
even one based on improper grounds, was a former jeopardy.'44
Notwithstanding broad decisions like Williams, Gaskins, Ar-
nett, and Ball, Kentucky courts have refused to find that an accused
is placed in double jeopardy when an indictment against him is
invalid. In Mount v. Commonwealth,442 the court ruled that a
conviction set aside because of an insufficient indictment does not
bar another prosecution for the same offense. 443 The court rea-
soned: "In the established sense of the Constitution, the accused,
in such a case, was never 'in jeopardy,"' and, therefore, the
defendant's demurrer was properly disregarded by the lower court.44
Likewise, in Adams v. Commonwealth,445 the defendant's first
conviction for maliciously shooting and wounding with intent to
kill was reversed because of an invalid indictment. The court
41 Hardy v. Commonwealth, 254 S.W. 900, 901 (Ky. 1923).
436 405 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. 1966).
01 See Commonwealth v. Mullins, 405 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Ky. 1966).
438 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
139 Mullins, 405 S.W.2d at 30.
-' 104 S.W. 325 (Ky. 1907).
"I See Commonwealth v. Ball, 104 S.W. 325, 325-26 (Ky. 1907).
"2 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 93 (1865).
" See Mount v. Commonwealth, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 93, 94 (1865).
4" Id.
-5 92 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1936).
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expressly held that the defendant's subsequent conviction on the
same charge did not violate the constitution because the defendant
was not previously in jeopardy. Similarly, the high court has found
that retrying a defendant, after the first trial resulted in a hung
jury, does not offend the double jeopardy clause of the Kentucky
Constitution.446
Similarly, separate civil penalties incurred under two statutes
prohibiting the same act do not constitute double jeopardy. In
1831, Elizabeth Gilbert was indicted for "endanger[ing] the security
of the aggregate society" by permitting her slave "to go at large
and hire herself out" in Madison County." 7 Mrs. Gilbert was
ordered to pay a penalty of 10 pounds to Madison County under
an 1802 law. She was also indicted and ordered to pay a penalty
to the town of Richmond for the same offense, under an act of
1825 that regulated "peculiarly demoralizing and perilous" activi-
ties of slaves at large. Mrs. Gilbert claimed that the penalties were
unconstitutional under the double jeopardy provision of the Ken-
tucky Constitution. The high court disagreed in Commonwealth v.
Gilbert.448 The court held that the state legislature possessed the
power to inflict more than one civil penalty for the same offense,
provided that the penalty did not affect "life or limb." 449 The
court concluded that the acts of 1802 and 1825 were "perfectly
harmonious," analyzing as follows:
If both penalties should have been inflicted on Mrs. Gilbert, she
would have had no cause for complaining that she had been
punished twice for the same offence. Even if the offenses had
been precisely the same, the legislature had the power to inflict
a penalty in behalf of the town, and another penalty in behalf
of the county. We know of no constitutional principle which




In addition to the statutory rules of construction, Kentucky
courts have relied upon federal constitutional precedent to resolve
questions of double jeopardy. Kentucky protections often mirror
federal protections. For instance, in Stamps v. Commonwealth,
41l
4 6 See Cornwell v. Commonwealth, 523 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1975).
"I See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 29 Ky. (6 J.J. Marsh.) 184, 184 (1831).
4" 29 Ky. (6 J.J. Marsh.) 184, 184 (1831).
"9 Id. at 188.
4' Id. at 187.
15 648 S.W.2d 568, 569 (1983).
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the court applied the holding of Oregon v. Kennedy452 to Kentucky's
double jeopardy clause. The court held that section 13 does not
preclude retrial where the first trial is terminated by manifest
necessity, absent prosecutorial or judicial misconduct.4 3 Section 13
neither prohibits retrial when the first trial ended in mistrial due
to a hung jury, nor when the first conviction was obtained due to
invalidity of the original indictment. However, as Williams, Gas-
kins, and Arnett illustrate, section 13 does prohibit retrial on a
different degree of the same offense following acquittal. And, as
Mullins indicates, section 13 disallows retrial following acquittal
by a directed verdict.
N. Right of Access to Courts
§ 14. All courts shall be open and every person, for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay.4 4
1. Textual Evolution
Although the framers of the federal constitution gave no ex-
pression to the right of access to the courts, the lack of an express
textual basis has proved to be no impediment to finding the right
implied within the various amendments. These include the provi-
sions permitting petition for redress of grievances in the first
amendment, the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, the speedy and public trial guaranties in the sixth
amendment, and the privileges and immunities and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.4 5 Kentucky, however, has
incorporated an express, distinct right of access in each of its
constitutions .416 This expressly declared right offers the immediate
advantage of avoiding debate over its source and the level of
protection that it warrants. Its wording, which has remained un-
changed over Kentucky's two hundred year constitutional history,45 7
452 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
113 See Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 568, 569 (1983).
41 KY. CONST. § 14.
411 See L. TRiBE, AMI~mcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 753-60, 1461-63, 1640-41 (1988).
416 See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 13; Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 13; Ky.
CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 15; Ky. CONST. § 14.
411 Compare Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 13 and KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 13
and Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 15 with KY. CONST. § 14.
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was adopted originally from the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1790.458 The framers of the Kentucky Constitution, however, omit-
ted the last clause of the Pennsylvania provision that provided for
lawsuits "against the commonwealth in such manner, in such courts,
and in such cases as the legislature may by law direct. ' 45 9 Although
Pennsylvania retains this provision in the Declaration of Rights of
its current constitution,4 Kentucky has declined to incorporate
such an express right of suit into any of its four constitutions.
2. Judicial Interpretation
In Johnson v. Higgins,461 the court expressed the spirit of
section 14 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights. Interpreting the identical
provision in article 13, section 15 of the 1850 Kentucky Constitu-
tion, the court declared that the Kentucky courts
are to be held in an open and public manner, and their proceed-
ings are not to be secret or concealed from public view .... They
are to administer justice without sale-that is they are not to
accept compensation from litigants; ... They are not to deny
any one a fair trial, nor to delay the same, except upon sufficient
legal grounds for continuance.
462
Indeed, Kentucky courts have regarded section 14 as the guard-
ian "against encroachment upon those jural rights which had be-
come well established before the adoption of the Constitution.' '463
For example, in Ludwig v. Johnson 464 the court recognized that a
cause of action based on negligence is a "jural right," holding
that "a guest statute" was an encroachment on this constitutional
right.46 Also, fifty-four years later, in Hawkins v. Sunmark In-
dustries, Inc. ,466 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the "Fire-
man's Rule, ' 467 which protects property owners from liability for
411 See infra Appendix.
... PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 11.
4' PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
- 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 566 (1862).
Johnson v. Higgins, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 566, 570 (1862).
'- Kentucky Util. Co. v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop., 438 S.W.2d 788, 790
(Ky. 1968).
- 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
461 Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347, 350-351 (Ky. 1932) (holding that guest statute
abrogates common law rights preserved by Constitution).
- 727 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1986).
- Hawkins v. Sunmark Indus., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Ky. 1986).
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negligently starting a fire, necessitating a fireman's presence, did
not violate section 14. In Hawkins, the court reasoned that the
"Fireman's Rule" was a common law rule predating the 1891
Constitution.
46 8
In one of its most recent pronouncements relating to section
14, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that a statute of repose,
placing a five year cap on negligence or malpractice actions against
health care professionals, violated the "open courts" clause of this
provision. 469 In McCollum v. Sisters of Charity,470 the court held
that the clause "prohibit[s] the abolition or diminution of legal
remedies for personal injuries and wrongful death, a theme that
has appeared in Kentucky's constitution since 1792." '47 Directing
its constitutional inquiry to whether the cause of action affected
by the statute had become established prior to the adoption of the
Kentucky Constitution in 1792, the court found that a medical
malpractice action existed long before the first state constitution
and that the state legislature lacked "constitutional power to extin-
guish it. "472 The court concluded that the statute was "antithetical
to the purpose of the 'open courts' provision," quipping that the
plaintiff "need not board th[e] bus to Topsy-Turvey Land. '473
Although Kentucky courts have found that section 14 "prohib-
its the legislature from invading the province of the judiciary," 474
they have not interpreted it as broadly as the history of the pro-
vision suggests it might be. The provision has been found to place
few limits on the legislative power to restrict resort to the courts.
For example, the high court has found that section 14 does not
forbid the clerk of a court from collecting filing fees from those
that can afford them. In Harbison v. George,475 Charles George
attempted to file a petition in a circuit court, seeking to recover
$256.64 on a note. The circuit clerk refused to file the petition
without a $5 payment pursuant to an act of 1928. George brought
"I See id. at 399.
40 See McCollum v. Sisters of Charity, 799 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1990).
470 799 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1990).
47 Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
472 Id. at 19.
473 Id.
414 See Commonwealth v. Werner, 280 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Ky. 1955); see also Kendall
v. Beiling, 175 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Ky. 1943) (stating that legislative enactment may not
shorten "the arm of the court").
-5 14 S.W.2d 405 (Ky. 1929).
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an action against the clerk, seeking an injunction to compel the
clerk to file his petition. The court granted the request.476
On appeal, George argued that the court's judgment should be
affirmed because the 1928 act contravened section 14 of the Ken-
tucky Bill of Rights. Before reaching the merits of George's argu-
ment, the appellate court explained that the history of the provision
dated back to the Magna Charta:
It was then customary for officers to exact fines as the price of
administering justice which constituted a species of bribery. They
were arbitrary exactions, that went to the officers, and in no way
similar to exactions for legitimate expenses of litigation.
477
The court further noted that the purpose of section 14 was "to
correct such abuses, among others, that induced the barons of
England to wrest from King John the Magna Charta. The right
thus obtained has been preserved in practically all state Constitu-
tions." 478 Relying on decisional law of other states, including Ar-
kansas, Indiana, Montana, and North Dakota, that upheld
analogous acts as valid under similar constitutional provisions, the
court concluded: "Provisions in state statutes for the payment in
advance of fees allowed by law, and incurred pending the litigation,
do not contravene the rights guarantied by such a constitutional
provision." 479
The court reached a similar result in J.B.B. Coal Co. v. Hal-
bert.480 A coal company had filed a petition, alleging that the trial
judge's failure to rule on its demurrer to an answer violated section
14. The appeals court disagreed, stating that section 14
cannot be invoked as here attempted, unless it is clearly made to
appear that there has been such an unreasonable or arbitrary
failure or refusal upon the part of the judge to act as would so
unduly delay a trial or such preparation for trial, as to amount
to a denial of justice .... [N]o such showing has been made in
this case .... 41
476 See Harbison v. George, 14 S.W.2d 405, 405 (Ky. 1929).
11 Id. at 405-06.
411 Id. at 405-06.
" Id. at 406.
184 S.W. 1116 (Ky. 1916).
J.B.B. Coal Co. v. Halbert, 184 S.W. 1116, 1121 (Ky. 1916).
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0. Power to Suspend Laws
§ 15. No power to suspend laws shall be exercised, unless by the
general assembly or its authority.
482
1. Textual Evolution
The guaranty against arbitrary and unauthorized suspension of
laws was in the original Kentucky Bill of Rights. This clause
provided: "That no power of suspending laws shall be exercised,
unless by the legislature or its authority.' '483 Although no minutes
of the drafting committee survive to prove its purpose, the provi-
sion seems to be a safeguard against capricious exercise of authority
by the judicial branch. The wording of the provision mirrored the
guaranty in the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights of 1790 44 with minor
stylistic changes.
2. Judicial Interpretation
According to the Kentucky high court, this constitutional pro-
vision applies to valid administrative orders that have the same
legal force as statutes. 41 In Gering v. Brown Hotel Corp. ,486 an
employee instituted an action against her employer to recover the
difference between her actual wages and those prescribed by a
minimum wage order of the state Commissioner of Labor. 48 7 The
order, issued on June 6, 1962, was to become effective on August
1, 1962. During the interim period, several employers filed a peti-
tion for review of the order. The circuit court issued an injunction,
staying enforcement of the wage order pending the final determi-
nation of its validity. 488 The employers contended that the injunc-
tion postponed the effective date of the wage order from August
1, 1962 until February 14, 1964, when the court's decision became
final.489 Agreeing with the employers, the circuit court granted
summary judgment. 49° Reversing the judgment of the circuit court,
41 KY. CONST. § 15.
41 KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 14.
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 12; see also infra Appendix.
4 See Gering v. Brown Hotel Corp., 376 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1965).
4S6 376 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1965).
I" See id. at 333-34.
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the appeals court found the employer's contention devoid of merit,
characterizing it as "demonstrably untenable," ' 49' and held that
suspension of the minimum wage order did not change its effective
date.4 92 The court reasoned that a stay "simply delays the day of
reckoning" without extinguishing "obligations to comply from the
effective date of the order. ' 493 Applying section 15 of the Kentucky
Constitution to the administrative order, the court explained: "[T]he
judicial branch has power and authority to stay temporarily the
enforcement of such order pending judicial review of its validity,
which is a form of suspension. But it is only because this provi-
sional relief does not alter the ultimate effectiveness of the order
that is constitutionally valid." 494 The court expressly cautioned that
if a court should purport to change the effective date of a valid
administrative order, "it would certainly be suspending the law in
violation of section 15 of the Kentucky Constitution.
'495
P. Habeas Corpus
§ 16. All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient securities, unless
for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great; and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it.496
1. Textual Evolution
The writ of habeas corpus provides one method of testing the
legality of a particular detention. The first habeas corpus provision
in the Kentucky Constitution was included in article XII, section
16 of the 1792 version and provided: "[T]he privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. ' ' 497 This
provision was identical to the habeas corpus guaranty contained in
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 179091 and, like Pennsylvania's
491 Id.
"I See id. at 337.
493 Id.
49I d. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
49I Id. at 337.
"1 KY. CONST. § 16.
191 Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 16.
"1 See infra Appendix.
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present habeas corpus provision, 499 has not been broadened or




Despite the frequent use of the writ of habeas corpus, the
constitutional provision guarantying that right has seldom been
invoked.50 1 Indeed, the Kentucky appellate courts have not issued
reported. decisions directly confronting that provision. However,
the courts of Kentucky have, on occasion, addressed the signifi-
cance of this "hallowed article of liberty," and, citing directly to
English law, explained that the guaranty "is today exactly what it
was in the beginning . . . the prevention of unjust vexation by
reiterated commitments for the same offense.''502
In Young v. Russell, °3 the court stated the rule as follows:
when a judicial inquiry has been made "upon the solemn writ of
habeas corpus, into the legality of the detention and has resulted
in a discharge, ' '504 the judgment, "whether erroneous or not, and
being in favor of personal liberty is final and conclusive and not
subject to appeal or writ of error.
' 50 5
In Duke v. Smith,5 6 the court explained that the habeas corpus
provision guaranties to an individual "the right at any time to
resort to habeas corpus, if the petition sets forth legal justification
for the issuance of the writ, the burden devolves upon the Com-
monwealth to prove facts showing the petitioner's detention with-





§ 17. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted. 09
"9 PA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
'4 Compare Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 15 and Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 15
and Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 17 with Ky. CONST. § 17.
' The only case interpreting section 16 is Baker v. Smith, 477 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1971).
This case held that "prisoners," in the section, includes persons held pending trial on
charge of crime.
'0 Young v. Russell, 332 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. 1960).
101 332 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. 1960).
Id. at 632.
-o0 Id. at 631 (quoting CHURcH, THE W= oF HABEAs Cosuus 520 (1886)).
253 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1952).
'0 Duke v. Smith, 253 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Ky. 1952).
Ky. CONST. § 17.
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1. Textual Evolution
The guaranty against cruel punishment, which is textually sim-
ilar to the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment in the United States Constitution,5° was incorporated
into the Kentucky Constitution of 1792 and provided: "That ex-
cessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel punishments inflicted.'' 51 Except for minor grammatical al-
terations, this provision has been neither broadened nor changed
in two hundred years.
5 1'
2. Judicial Interpretation
The federal protection against cruel or unusual punishment
appears in the eighth amendment.512 In capital cases, the eighth
amendment requires an individualized sentencing determination that
takes into account the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense.513 In non-
capital cases, individualized sentencing reflects an enlightened pol-
icy rather than a constitutional imperative. Because most claims of
cruel and unusual punishment are waged on eighth amendment
grounds,5 4 it is no surprise that only a few decisions expressly
address the nature of Kentucky's constitutional protection. In Skaggs
v. Commonwealth,5 5 the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the
imposition of the death penalty with respect to a defendant con-
victed of murdering an elderly couple, finding the Kentucky death
penalty statute constitutional.51 6 In support of its finding, the court
stated that there had been no showing that the statute was "arbi-
trary, discriminatory or freakishly applied.
'517
10 See infra note 514.
,10 Ky. CoNsT. of 1792, art. XII, § 15.
11 Compare KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 17 and KY. CoNsT. of 1799, art. X, § 17
and KY. CONT. of 1850, art. XIII, § 19 with Ky. CONST. § 18.
:12 See infra note 514.
,1 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
114 The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Cor S. amend VIII. The
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962).
"1 556 S.W.2d 672 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130 (1986).





In 1985, the court of appeals was presented with a constitu-
tional challenge to a state statute on the ground that the phrase in
the statute, "cruel punishment," was unconstitutionally vague.
Finding it "ironic" that the challenge was based on the "very
term" used in both the Kentucky and United States Constitutions,
the court, in Cutrer v. Commonwealth,1 8 rejected the challenge.
The court explained: "Our courts experience no difficulty in de-
termining what constitutes cruel punishment within the strictures
of Section 17 .... Cruel punishment is punishment which shocks
the general conscience and violates the principles of fundamental
fairness. Outside the criminal arena, our cases define 'cruel' as
'heartless and unfeeling."' 51 9
Moreover, according to Kentucky's highest court, the provision
prohibiting cruel punishment was intended to forbid inhumane
conduct, such as quartering. 520 In Hill v. Commonwealth,5 2' the
defendant was convicted of assault and battery of a woman and
was sentenced to six months in jail and $500. He argued that this
punishment violated the cruel punishment provision of the state
constitution. The court disagreed, holding that the sentence was
reasonable and not unconstitutional.52 2
Under this provision, Kentucky courts tend to defer to the
legislative judgments establishing adequate punishment for a crim-
inal offense. In McElwain v. Commonwealth,523 the court upheld
the conviction of John McElwain for malicious shooting and
wounding with intent to kill, which provided for twenty-one years
of imprisonment.5 24 Unpersuaded by McElwain's contention that
his punishment was excessive, in contravention of section 17, the
court observed that McElwain had made a murderous and unpro-
voked assault on the victim (the victim miraculously escaped, but
sustained crippling injuries). The court found that the verdict was
within proper limits for such an offense, as established by the state
legislature. The court concluded that the legislature possessed the
discretion to determine what constituted "adequate punishment.' '525
18 697 S.W.2d 156 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (construing KRS, supra note 24, at §§ 508.110,
508.120 (1990)).
"I Cutrer v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (citations
omitted).
50 See Hill v. Commonwealth, 264 S.W. 1045, 1045 (Ky. 1924).
264 S.W. 1045 (Ky. 1924).
See id. at 1046.
159 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1942).
114 See McElwain v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Ky. 1942).
"I Id. at 12.
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In Praete v. Commonwealth,526 the court upheld a criminal
statute punishing minors for drunk driving. The statute provided
that a person under eighteen convicted of drunk driving shall have
his or her license revoked until reaching age eighteen, or for twelve
months, whichever is longer. The statute was challenged as uncon-
stitutional for contravening the prohibition against cruel punish-
ment.5 27 The court reasoned that the penalty did "not shock the
conscience" and was neither "greatly disproportionate to the of-
fense, nor ... beyond what is necessary to achieve the legislative
intent. "152
R. Imprisonment for Debt
§ 18. The person of a debtor, where there is not strong presump-
tion of fraud, shall not be continued in prison after delivering
up his estate for the benefit of his creditors in such manner as
shall be prescribed by law.
5 29
1. Textual Evolution
The prohibition against imprisonment for debt appears to de-
rive from article IX, section 16 of Pennsylvania's 1790 Constitu-
tion.530 The language of section 18 in the Kentucky Constitution
can be traced directly to the Kentucky Constitution of 1792.531 This




In Rebhan v. Fuhrman5 3 the court expressly ruled that im-
prisonment of an individual for failure to comply with a court
contempt order, until that order is obeyed, does not violate the
state constitution's prohibition of imprisonment for debt.
534
:26 722 S.W.2d 602 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
'" See Praete v. Commonwealth, 722 S.W.2d 602, 602-03 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
.21 Id. at 603.
311 Ky. CONST. § 18.
130 See infra Appendix.
13, See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 17.
$32 Compare Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 17 and Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 17
and Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 19 with KY. CONST. § 18.
5' 50 S.W. 976 (Ky. 1899).
534 See Rebhan v. Fuhrman, 50 S.W. 976, 977 (Ky. 1899).
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Stinson v. Stinson535 addressed section 18 of the current Ken-
tucky Constitution in the context of a husband that had been jailed
for contempt for failing to pay alimony to his ex-wife. In Stinson,
the appellate court carefully distinguished between imprisonment
for the actual debt and imprisonment for failure to obey the court,




The court's finding in Stinson comports with Kentucky's historical
recognition that alimony or maintenance from one spouse to an-
other is not a debt within the meaning of section 18 of the Kentucky
Constitution.11
7
In Blanton v. Commonwealth538 a statute which imposed crim-
inal liability on a contractor for the failure to pay for labor and
materials from sums received from an owner was held permissible
under section 18 if the contractor possessed actual knowledge of
the amount due and owing, and a legal obligation to pay from
those proceeds received.5 39 The court explained that if the statute
imposed criminal liability upon a contractor acting in good faith
for a breach of contract, "the statute probably would violate
section 18 of the Kentucky Constitution which restricts imprison-
ment for debt. A penal statute which is no more than a debt
collecting statute is unconstitutional.' '
54
In Patterson v. Commonwealth,541 the defendant was convicted
of violating Kentucky's "cold check" statute. The statute provided
that a crime of theft by deception is committed if a person issues
or passes a worthless check and fails "to make good within ten
(10) days after receiving notice of that refusal. ' 542 On appeal, the
defendant presented "a case of first impression in Kentucky '5 43 to
the court of appeals, contending that his conviction was tanta-
mount to imprisonment for a debt, a violation of sectiom 18 of the
Kentucky Constitution.
"' 223 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1949).
See Stinson v. Stinson, 223 S.W.2d 727, 728-29 (Ky. 1949).
117 See Rudd v. Rudd, 214 S.W. 791 (Ky. 1919) (holding that imprisonment for
contempt for disobedience of a court order to pay over money to an ex-spouse not
imprisonment for a debt).
:38 562 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
"5 See Blanton v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 90, 93-94 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
140 Id. at 94. See also Burnam v. Commonwealth, 15 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1929); Ward v.
Commonwealth, 15 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1929).
-- 556 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1977).
141 See Patterson v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 976 (1977) (quoting KRS, supra note 24, at § 514.040(b) (1974)).
, Id. at 911.
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Unpersuaded by the defendant's contention, the court affirmed
the conviction, reasoning that "the worthless check statute does
not punish one for a debt but rather for a fraudulent act. Since
intent to defraud is an essential element, it is not in violation of
Section 18 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibiting imprisonment
for debt." 5" Additionally, in Farmer v. Cassinelli,5 45 the court held
that section 18 was not violated by a state law that imposed liability
on an individual that sold mortgaged property without the written
consent of the mortgagees. 46
S. Ex Post Facto, or Law Impairing Contracts Forbidden
§ 19. No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation
of contracts, shall be enacted.547
1. Textual Evolution
The guaranty against ex post facto laws, which prevents the
legislature from imposing new burdens on existing rights, was in
the Kentucky Constitution of 1792.548 The provision, identical to
Section 17 of Pennsylvania's 1790 Constitution, simply stated that
"no ex post facto law, or any law impairing contracts, shall be
made. 5 49 Its language in section 19 of the current constitution is
virtually the same as that appearing in article 13, section 7 of the
1850 constitution 5 0 except that the second clause now provides
that no law "shall be enacted" to impair "the obligation of con-
tracts. 551 The 1850 changes seem to be stylistic rather than sub-
stantive.
2. Judicial Interpretation
Kentucky courts historically have concluded that the ex post
facto provision of Section 19 applied only to criminal statutes
altering the accused's situation to his disadvantage and to laws
I" Id. at 912.
-5 303 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. 1957).
See Farmer v. Cassinelli, 303 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ky. 1957).
KY. CONST. § 19.
See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 18.
1,9 Id.; see also infra Appendix.
:o Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 20.
1" Compare id. with KY. CONST. § 19.
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inflicting punishments or penalties .552 As early as 1866, however,
Kentucky had held that an act cannot be retroactive so as to make
one civilly responsible for an act that, when done, did not give rise
to liability. In O'Donoghue v. Akin s55 1 the court refused to sustain
an act applied retroactively that made a person civilly responsible
for the killing of another. When the murder was committed, under
the existing law the actor was not civilly liable s. 5 4 In support of its
holding, the court reasoned that such a law "partakes of the
obnoxious spirit of all ex post facto legislation in authorizing
vindictive damages, not merely compensatory, but highly puni-
tory."'15
Some statutes, however, may be retroactively applied. In
Thornton v. McGrath5 56 the court sustained a law that authorized
suits confirming prior sales of land for the benefit of infants. The
court explained that while retrospective legislation "may often be
impolitic and unjust" it is not necessarily unconstitutional.5 57 The
court upheld the law, explaining that although it did not agree
with the enactment of retroactive laws, such laws were not prohib-
ited under the ex post facto provision of the state constitution . 58
Similarly, in Johnson v. Laffoon5 59 the court upheld a law that
gave the governor power to remove an appointed commissioner at
will against an ex post facto challenge. The court reasoned that
the officer held the post from its inception subject to removal as
prescribed by law.
5 60
Statutes that regulate procedure fall outside the ex post facto
provision's scope. The high court has held that modification of
parole procedure 5 61 and revocation of a defendant's probation
I" See Thorton v. McGrath, 62 Ky. (I Duv.) 349 (1864); Henderson & Nashville R.R.
v. Dickerson, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 173 (1856); Fisher v. Cockerill, 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Mon.)
129 (1827).
"1 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 478 (1866).
11 See O'Donoghue v. Akin, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 478, 478-79 (1866) (Legislation that is
applied retroactively may be constitutional if it simply "regulates remedies for existing rights
and wrongs, or aids or confirms rights," but personal or proprietary rights cannot be
injuriously affected by such legislation.).
I Id. at 480.
62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 349 (1864).
S Thornton v. McGrath, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 349, 354-55 (1864). An ex post facto law
imposes criminal liability upon an act legal at the time of undertaking. Retrospective
legislation is unconstitutional only when it divests a vested right.
Id. at 401.
77 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1935).
161 See Johnson v. Laffoon, 77 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Ky. 1935).
561 See Morris v. Wingo, 428 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. 1968).
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where it did not increase the sentence for his conviction, do not
violate the rule against ex post facto laws. 62 Moreover, if a statute
deprives an accused of a substantive right held under prior law,
the new law is void as an ex post facto law. In Commonwealth v.
Brown5 61 the defendant argued that the abolishment of a law after
he committed a criminal act enabled the commonwealth to convict
him based upon less evidence than previously required.5 64 The
previous law prohibited a conviction based on the testimony of an
accomplice, unless such testimony was corroborated by other evi-
dence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of
the offense.5 65 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that ex post facto
laws include laws that alter rules of evidence. The court stated: "It
matters not that the retroactive reduction in the quantum of proof
results from the exercise of the judicial rulemaking power rather
than from an enactment of a legislative body.
566
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Reneer5 67 the Kentucky
Supreme Court drew a fine line between procedure and substance.
In Reneer, the court distinguished Brown finding that application
of a truth-in-sentencing statute to a defendant, who had allegedly
committed an offense before the statute's effective date, did not
violate the prohibition of ex post facto laws.5 68 Likewise, in Com-
monwealth v. Ball5 69 the court, in construing section 19, held that
a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol received
prior to the enactment of a statute penalizing multiple like offen-
ders could be used in determining whether the person convicted
was a multiple offender.570 The court further ruled that the statute
could be given retroactive effect since it did not create a new
offense but merely imposed different penalties on the same criminal
act, dependent on the status of the offender.
5 71
'61 See Brown v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
- 619 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1981).
6 See Commonwealth v. Brown, 619 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Ky. 1981).
565 See id.
:66 Id.
- 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987).
' See Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Ky. 1987).
691 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1985).
:70 See Commonwealth v. Ball, 691 S.W.2d 207, 209-10 (Ky. 1985).
" See id. at 210; see also Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445 (1986) (holding
that the use of a pre-sentencing enhancement conviction for driving under the influence for
sentencing enhancement was not an ex post facto application of the law).
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T. Prohibition Against Bills of Attainder
§ 20. No person shall be attainted of treason or felony by the
general assembly, and no attainder shall work corruption of
blood, nor, except during the life of the offender, forfeiture of
estate to the Commonwealth.5
72
1. Textual Evolution
Traditionally, bills of attainder were legislative acts imposing
punishment on specific individuals. Kentucky's bill of attainder
provision prohibits the state legislature from assuming judicial
functions and conducting trials.5 73 Consequently, the provision pro-
scribes any legislative act that applies either to named individuals
or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to
inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial.5 74
The prohibition against bills of attainder was announced first
in Kentucky by article XII, section 20 of the 1792 Kentucky Bill
of Rights and stated simply, "[t]hat no attainder shall work cor-
ruption of blood, nor, except during the life of the offender,
forfeiture of estate to the commonwealth. ' 575 Adopted from article
IX, section 19 of the 1790 Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, the wording
of the Kentucky provision was changed in 1890 when the phrase
"No person shall be attainted for treason or felony by the general
assembly" was added to extend the provision's coverage.5 76
2. Judicial Interpretation
Kentucky courts have interpreted this provision infrequently.
The high court construed section 20 narrowly in Arciero v. Hager.5 7 7
The issue in that case was whether a Kentucky statute that provided
for no legal relationship between an adopted child and its birth
parents with respect to personal or property rights violated the
prohibition against bills of attainder.5 78 The court held that the
11 Ky. CONST. § 20.
"I Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (6th ed. 1990).
574 Cf. id.
171 KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 20.
76 Ky. CONST. of 1890, art. XIII, §§ 21, 22; see also infra Appendix.
397 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965).
See Anciero v. Hager, 397 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Ky. 1965).
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statute did not fall within purview of the attainder section because
bills of attainder refer "only to punishment for crime.
'579
U. Descent in Cases of Suicide
§ 21. The estate of such persons as shall destroy their own lives
shall descend or vest as in cases of natural death; and if any




Section 21 derives from article IX, section 19 of the 1790
Pennsylvania Constitution.5 81 This section was incorporated into
the Kentucky Constitution in 1792 and has remained unchanged.
5 82
2. Judicial Interpretation
Section 21 has not been construed in published decisions.
V. Quartering of Soldiers
§ 22. No standing army shall, in time of peace, be maintained
without the consent of the general assembly; and the military
shall, in all cases and at all times, be in strict subordination to
the civil power; nor shall any soldier, in time of peace, be
quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in
time of war, except in a manner prescribed by law. 8 3
1. Textual Evolution
Textually similar to its federal counterpart in the third amend-
ment of the United States Constitution,584 the Kentucky draftsmen
of the 1792 Constitution included this provision in article XII,
5" Id.
:so KY. CONST. § 21.
1' See infra Appendix.
"8 Compare KY. CoNsT. of 1792, art. XII, § 21 and KY. CoNsT. of 1799, art. X, § 21
and KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 23 with KY. CONST. of 1890 bill of rights, § 21.
59 KY. CONST. § 22.
511 The third amendment states "No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. III.
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sections 24 and 25,585 which were later combined into one provi-
sion.586 The language of this provision was taken directly from
sections 22 and 23 of the 1790 Pennsylvania Bill of Rights587 and




Section 22 has not been construed in published decisions.
W. Prohibition of Nobility; Term of Years
§ 23. The general assembly shall not grant any title of nobility
or hereditary distinction, nor create any office, the appointment
of which shall be for a longer time than a term of years.
589
1. Textual Evolution
Reflecting a concern for the inequalities of status flowing from
lineage, the Kentucky statesmen, like their forefathers that framed
the Declaration of Independence in 1776, determined that in Ken-
tucky there should be no titles or privileges of Dukes, Earls, or
other classes of nobility. To assure equality of political and legal
rights in Kentucky, the 1792 Constitution stated "[t]hat the legis-
lature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction,
nor create any office the appointment to which shall be for a
longer term than during good behavior."' 5-9 Sharing their concerns
with the framers of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Kentucky
draftsmen borrowed the language of this guaranty from article 9,
section 24 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, with the minor
grammatical change from "appointment to which" to "appoint-
ment of which." ' 59'
Although the import of the provision has remained the same,
the drafters of the 1850 Kentucky Constitution rewrote the last
585 Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, §§ 24, 25.
"' Compare id. with KY. CONST. § 22.
7 See infra Appendix.
"I Compare Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, §§ 24, 25 and KY. CoNsT. of 1799, art. X,
§ 24, 25 and Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, §§ 26, 27 with Ky. CONST. bill of rights, §
22.
" KY. CONST. § 23.
10 KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 26.
91 Compare KY. CONST. § 23 with PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 24.
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clause, changing the phrase "during good behavior," to "term of
years. "592
2. Judicial Interpretation
In 1903, Kentucky's high court invalidated a legislative act that
failed to limit the time during which members of a private police
and detective agency could exercise their powers to arrest and
imprison. 93 In Swincher v. Commonwealth,5 94 the court held that
since the act failed to require moral character, citizenship of the
United States, or allegiance to either the nation or the state of
Kentucky, "the Legislature could not constitutionally grant such
extraordinary powers to private citizens." 5 95 Noting that the failure
to limit "exclusive privileges" is likely to create a "position for
life,' '596 the court applied section 23 of the Kentucky Constitution
expressly, which "prohibits the legislature from creating any office,
the appointment of which shall be for a longer time than a term
of years.
'5 97
The court in Neumeyer v. Krake1598 went so far as to express
doubt concerning whether a statute providing that a city policeman
could not be removed during good behavior violated section 23.
The court subsequently found, in City of Louisville v. Ross,s99 that
such a law did not offend the Kentucky Constitution.
The courts of Kentucky have invoked section 23 sparingly,
refusing to apply it to "offices held at the pleasure of the appoint-
ing power." 600 In Kratzer v.- Commonwealth,60' a search of Kratz-
er's Grocery uncovered a gallon of moonshine. The police then
charged Lawrence Kratzer with possession of intoxicating liquor. 602
Kratzer challenged the search on the ground that the affidavit
supporting the search warrant was made before an examiner who
was not authorized to administer an oath. Kratzer contended that
the examiner's term could not exceed that of the office of the
9 KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 28.
- See Swincher v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W. 306 (Ky. 1903).




5' 62 S.W. 518 (Ky. 1901).
5' 129 S.W. 101 (Ky. 1910).
61 See Kratzer v. Commonwealth, 15 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Ky. 1929).
611 15 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1929).
62 See id. at 474.
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appointing power without violating section 23 of the Kentucky
Constitution 0 On appeal, the court ruled that the appointment
of an examiner, who holds office at the pleasure of the court, does
not offend section 23. The court explained that because the ex-
aminer was removable at the discretion of the court, "there [was]
no fixed time during which he may claim the office as a matter of
right, and therefore no term for a period longer than four years.' '
Relying on Kratzer, the high court found in City of Owensboro
v. Hazel,6°5 that a municipal ordinance providing that a city man-
ager holds office at the discretion of the mayor and the board of
commissioners did not violate section 23.60
The court has also refused to apply section 23 to enjoin en-
forcement of a statute authorizing the appointment of city person-
nel by university trustees and the board of education.6 In Kerr v.
City of Louisville,6°s Robert Kerr instituted an action against the
City of Louisville, its mayor, the board of education, the University
of Louisville, and University trustees, to enjoin and restrain en-
forcement of a legislative act that authorized the appointment of
city personnel by the school's board of trustees and the city's
board of education, rather than "local authorities.'"'
The court reasoned that section 23 must be read in conjunction
with section 160 of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides
specifically for the terms of office and the manner of election and
appointment of municipal officers. 610 Noting that section 160 fur-
ther provides that the "terms of office shall be four years, and
until their successors shall be qualified," the court concluded that
it was not the intent of the framers of the Kentucky Constitution
to limit the appointment of municipal officers to a term of years.
61
Rather, the court reasoned that the matter was left to the legislature
and local municipalities, "to create minor municipal offices and to
appoint officers to them who may hold either during good behavior
or the pleasure of the appointing power, as the law may direct. ' 612
W3 See id.
614 Id. at 475; see also City of Lexington v. Rennick, 49 S.W. 787 (Ky. 1899) (police
officer held office at pleasure of appointing powers).
6 17 S.W.2d 1031 (Ky. 1929).
See City of Owensboro v. Hazel, 17 S.W.2d 1031, 1034 (Ky. 1929).
6w See Kerr v. City of Louisville, 111 S.W.2d 1046 (Ky. 1938).
111 S.W.2d 1046 (Ky. 1938).
See id. at 1047-49.
610 See id. at 1051.
611 See id.
612 Id. at 1051.
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X. Right to Emigrate
§ 24. Emigration from the state shall not be prohibited.
613
1. Textual Evolution
The right to emigrate from Kentucky was included in the Ken-
tucky Constitution of 1792, which provided: "That emigration
from the State shall not be prohibited. ' 614 This provision was
adopted verbatim from article IX, section 25 of the 1790 Pennsyl-
vania Bill of Rights.6
15
Emigration denotes movement from the state, but the drafts-
men particularly intended to guaranty migration into the state, or
"immigration," to promote- expansion of the Commonwealth and
its economy.616 Additionally, a large majority of the 1791 conven-
tion delegates favored the protection of slavery;617 therefore, this
provision protected the rights of migrants to bring slaves into
Kentucky for their own use. 618 This assisted Kentucky estate holders
who were seeking to accumulate and increase their holdings. This
provision has remained unchanged through the present constitu-
tion.619
2. Judicial Interpretation
Section 24 has not been construed in published decisions.
Y. Prohibition Against Involuntary Servitude
§ 25. Slavery and involuntary servitude in this state are forbidden,
except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.6 20
61 Ky. CONST. § 24.
614 Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 27.
6,1 See infra Appendix.
616 See J. CowARD, supra note 2, at 62, 138-39, 166.
617 See id. at 62, 138, 166.
6,8 See id.
619 Compare Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 27 and Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 27
and Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 29 with KY. CONST. § 24.




Like its federal counterpart, section 25 of the Kentucky Con-
stitution was drafted in the aftermath of the Civil War. The text
is strikingly similar in wording to the thirteenth amendment.6 2'
Both the thirteenth amendment and section 25 memorialized the
changes in the country's political and social structure and reflect
the post-war struggle involving the rights of freed slaves.
Specifically, section 25 prohibited "slavery" and "involuntary
servitude" throughout the state of Kentucky and applied to all
persons subject to its jurisdiction. It proscribed such practices not
only by the state government, but by all private individuals as well.
2. Judicial Interpretation
In Jefferson County Teachers Association v. Board of Educa-
tion,622 the circuit court enjoined the county's school teachers from
participating in a strike.6 23 On appeal, the teachers asserted that
the issuance of the injunction constituted a denial of their right to
strike and, therefore, imposed a condition of "involuntary servi-
tude" on them.6 24 Citing to decisions of California, New Jersey,
and Florida, the Kentucky appeals court ruled that the injunction
did not offend section 25. The court stated: "[A]n injunction of
the kind before us does not compel performance of personal service
against the will of the employee because he can terminate his
contract if he so desires.' '625
Z. Preservation of Individual Liberties
§ 26. To guard against transgressions of the high powers which
we have delegated, we declare that everything in this Bill of Rights
is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall
forever remain inviolate; and all laws contrary thereto, or con-
trary to this Constitution, shall be void.626
611 The thirteenth amendment states in pertinent part: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.,
amend. XIII.
62 463 S.W.2d 627.
623 See id. at 628.
624 See id. at 630.
62, Id.
626 Ky. CONST. § 26.
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1. Textual Evolution
To ensure that governmental powers not encroach on the in-
dividual liberties guarantied by the Kentucky Bill of Rights, the
drafters, like their federal counterparts, restricted the power of the
state government, expressly building a sphere of protection around
individual rights. The original constitution stated: "To guard against
the high powers which have been delegated, we declare that eve-
rything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of
government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws
contrary thereto, or contrary to this constitution, shall be void.
' 627
Except for the insertion of the words "transgressions of," this
guaranty has remained unchanged to the present.
628
2. Judicial Interpretation
Section 26 recognizes the Kentucky Bill of Rights as the "su-
preme law of the Commonwealth." 629 As early as 1874, Kentucky
courts had asserted the protective thrust of section 26, refusing to
recognize "implied exceptions to the bill of rights.' '630 In Com-
monwealth v. Jones,63' the court characterized this provision as a
"solemn declaration" and pronounced that this provision "is never
to be lost sight of, and more especially in cases involving the
personal rights of the citizen is it entitled to high consideration.' '632
In Jones, the court invoked section 26 in ruling that provisions of
the state constitution providing for deprivation of the right to hold
public office do not necessarily "cut through the general provi-
sions, nor is the punishment prescribed, whether it be criminal or
political, an exception to the bill of rights.' '633
Thirty-six years later, in Columbia Trust Co. v. Lincoln Insti-
tute,634 the court ruled that an act, which made the right to operate
an industrial school conditional upon public election, violated sec-
tion 26. Likewise, in Fischer v. Grieb,635 the court continued to
6" KY. CONS1. of 1792, art. XII, § 26.
Compare Ky. CONST. of 1790, art. XII, § 28 and Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 28
and Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 30 with Ky. CONST. § 26.
See Gatewood, 403 S.W.2d at 718.
630 Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 725, 746 (1874).
61 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 725 (1874).
632 Id. at 747.
6' Id. at 746.
61 129 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1910).
63 133 S.W.2d 1139.
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invoke the protection of section 26, finding a legislative classifi-
cation excluding farmers engaged in a nonfarming business from
obtaining a "farmers truck" license to be without a reasonable
basis and unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Interpreting the Kentucky Bill of Rights in the Next Century
As Kentuckians enter the third century of their Bill of Rights, the
legal community should pay heightened attention to the rich history
embodied in that document. For the past two decades, state courts
throughout the nation have looked increasingly to their own con-
stitutions to establish the individual liberties enjoyed by their citi-
zens. 636 In part, this emphasis on "New Federalism" has been
brought about by the increased conservatism of the United States
Supreme Court, which has diminished its activity in the area of
individual rights at the federal level, often in the name of returning
power to the states. 6 7 Largely, however, the increased emphasis on
independent state constitutional analysis has resulted from the state
courts' recognition of the value of such documents in a federal
system. Each state constitution reflects a unique heritage. Many of
the leading colonies' constitutions (including the first Pennsylvania
Constitution, which ultimately influenced that of Kentucky) were
drafted in the midst of the American Revolution, a full decade
before the United States Constitution was born.6 18 Indeed, the
Kentucky Bill of Rights has been shaped and molded carefully by
the Kentucky courts over the past 200 years, reflecting Kentucky's
63 See Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1141 (1985); Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HRv. L. Rav. 489 (1977); Developments in the Law,
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HAv. L. REv. 1324 (1981); Linde, E
Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984); Maltz,
Williams & Araten, Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional Law, 1980-1989, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 1093 (1989); Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative,
63 TEx. L. REv. 1081 (1985).
637 See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n. 35 (1976); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 41-44 (1973).
638 See W. ADAms, supra note 22; Gormley, State Constitutions and Criminal Proce-
dure: A Primer for the 21st Century, 67 OR. L. REv. 689, 690-91 (1988).
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commitment to its own constitution long before state constitutional
law came into vogue on a national scale.639
Recent decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court, including See
v. Commonwealth6 and Rose v. Council for Better Education
641
demonstrate that the present Kentucky Supreme Court has invoked
the Kentucky Constitution aggressively to resolve some of the most
difficult issues facing the state today. As Kentucky prepares to
celebrate the bicentennial of its first constitutional convention, in
the year 1991, it must continue to forge its own unique constitu-
tional identity. An identity that Kentuckians, for good reason,
continue to don with a sense of vigor and pride.
639 See Brennan, supra note 636, at 495:
of late ... more and more state courts are construing state constitutional
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of
their states even more protection than the federal provisions, even those
identically phrased. This is surely an important and highly significant devel-
opment for our constitutional jurisprudence and for our concept of federalism.
746 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1988).
' 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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APPENDIX
KENTUCKY BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1792
(Bold type indicates virtually identical provision to corollary
section in the 1970 Pennsylvania Bill of Rights,
which is referred to parenthetically)
1. That the general, great, and essential principles of liberty
and free government may be recognized and established, WE DE-
CLARE that all men when they form a social compact, are equal,
and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate
public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in con-
sideration of public services.
2. THAT ALL POWER IS INHERENT IN THE PEOPLE, AND ALL FREE
GOVERNMENTS ARE FOUNDED ON THEIR AUTHORITY, AND INSTITUTED
FOR THEIR PEACE, SAFETY, AND HAPPINESS. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF THOSE ENDS, THEY HAVE AT ALL TIMES AN UNALIENABLE AND
INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT TO ALTER, REFORM, OR ABOLISH THEIR GOVERN-
MENT, IN SUCH MANNER AS THEY MAY THINK PROPER. (See PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 2.)
3. THAT ALL MEN HAVE A NATURAL AND INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT TO
WORSHIP ALMIGHTY GOD ACCORDING TO THE DICTATES OF THEIR
OWN CONSCIENCES; THAT NO MAN CAN OF RIGHT BE COMPELLED TO
ATTEND, ERECT, OR SUPPORT ANY PLACE OF WORSHIP, OR TO MAIN-
TAIN ANY MINISTRY AGAINST HIS CONSENT; THAT NO HUMAN AUTHOR-
ITY CAN, IN ANY CASE WHATEVER, CONTROL OR INTERFERE WITH THE
RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE; AND THAT NO PREFERENCE SHALL EVER BE
GIVEN BY LAW TO ANY RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES OR MODES OF WORSHIP.
(See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3.)
4. That the civil rights, privileges, or capacities of any citizen
shall in nowise be diminished or enlarged on account of his religion.
5. THAT ALL ELECTIONS SHALL BE FREE AND EQUAL. (See PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 5.)
6. THAT TRIAL BY JURY SHALL BE AS HERETOFORE, AND THE RIGHT
THEREOF REMAIN INVIOLATE. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, §
6.)
7. THAT PRINTING-PRESSES SHALL BE FREE TO EVERY PERSON WHO
UNDERTAKES TO EXAMINE THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGISLATURE OR
ANY BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT; AND NO LAW SHALL EVER BE MADE
TO RESTRAIN THE RIGHT THEREOF; THE FREE COMMUNICATION OF
THOUGHTS AND OPINIONS IS ONE OF THE INVALUABLE RIGHTS OF MAN,
AND EVERY CITIZEN MAY FREELY SPEAK, WRITE, AND PRINT ON ANY
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SUBJECT, BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABUSE OF THAT LIBERTY. (See
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7.)
8. IN PROSECUTIONS FOR THE PUBLICATIONS OF PAPERS, INVESTI-
GATING THE OFFICIAL CONDUCT OF OFFICERS OR MEN IN A PUBLIC
CAPACITY, OR WHERE THE MATTER PUBLISHED IS PROPER FOR PUBLIC
INFORMATION, THE TRUTH THEREOF MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE. AND
IN ALL INDICTMENTS FOR LIBELS, THE JURY SHALL HAVE A RIGHT TO
DETERMINE THE LAW AND THE FACTS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
COURT AS IN OTHER CASES. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7.)
9. THAT THE PEOPLE SHALL BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES,
PAPERS, AND POSSESSIONS FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEI-
ZURES; AND THAT NO WARRANT TO SEARCH ANY PLACE OR TO SEIZE
ANY PERSON OR THINGS, SHALL ISSUE WITHOUT DESCRIBING THEM AS
NEARLY AS MAY BE, NOR WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE SUPPORTED BY
OATH OR AFFIRMATION. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7.)
10. THAT IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, THE ACCUSED HATH A
RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND HIS COUNSEL; TO DEMAND THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM, TO MEET THE
WITNESSES FACE TO FACE, TO HAVE COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR OB-
TAINING WITNESSES IN HIS FAVOR, AND IN PROSECUTIONS BY INDICT-
MENT OR INFORMATION, A SPEEDY PUBLIC TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL
JURY OF THE VICINAGE; THAT HE CAN NOT BE COMPELLED TO GIVE
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIMSELF, NOR CAN HE BE DEPRIVED OF HIS LIFE,
LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY, UNLESS BY THE JUDGEMENT OF HIS PEERS, OR
THE LAW OF THE LAND. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9.)
11. THAT NO PERSON SHALL, FOR ANY INDICTABLE OFFENCE, BE
PROCEEDED AGAINST CRIMINALLY BY INFORMATION; EXCEPT IN CASES
ARISING IN THE LAND OR NAVAL FORCES, OR IN THE MILITIA WHEN IN
ACTUAL SERVICE, IN TIME OF WAR OR PUBLIC DANGER, OR BY LEAVE
OF THE COURT FOR OPPRESSION OR MISDEMEANOR IN OFFICE. (See PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 10.)
12. No PERSON SHALL, FOR THE SAME OFFENCE, BE TWICE PUT IN
JEOPARDY OF HIS LIFE OR LIMB; NOR SHALL ANY MAN'S PROPERTY BE
TAKEN OR APPLIED TO PUBLIC USE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF HIS
REPRESENTATIVES, AND WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION BEING PREVI-
OUSLY MADE TO HIM. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 10.)
13. THAT ALL COURTS SHALL BE OPEN, AND EVERY PERSON FOR
AN INJURY DONE HIM IN HIS LANDS, GOODS, PERSON, OR REPUTATION,
SHALL HAVE REMEDY BY THE DUE COURSE OF LAW; AND RIGHT AND
JUSTICE ADMINISTERED, WITHOUT SALE, DENIAL, OR DELAY. (See PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 11.)
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14. THAT NO POWER OF SUSPENDING LAWS SHALL BE EXERCISED,
UNLESS BY THE LEGISLATURE OR ITS AUTHORITY. (See PA. CONST. of
1790, art. IX, § 12.)
15. THAT EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED, NOR EXCESSIVE
FINES IMPOSED, NOR CRUEL PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED. (See PA. CONST.
of 1790, art. IX, § 13.)
16. THAT ALL PRISONERS SHALL BE BAILABLE BY SUFFICIENT SUR-
ETIES, UNLESS FOR CAPITAL OFFENCES, WHEN THE PROOF IS EVIDENT
OR PRESUMPTION GREAT; AND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED, UNLESS WHEN IN CASES OF REBEL-
LION OR INVASION, THE PUBLIC SAFETY MAY REQUIRE IT. (See PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 14.)
17. THAT THE PERSON OF A DEBTOR, WHERE THERE IS NOT STRONG
PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD, SHALL NOT BE CONTINUED IN PRISON AFTER
DELIVERING UP IlS ESTATE FOR THE BENEFIT OF I-US CREDITORS, IN
SUCH MANNER AS SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW. (See PA. CONST. of
1790, art. IX, § 16.)
18. THAT NO EX POST FACTO LAW, NOR ANY LAW IMPAIRING
CONTRACTS, SHALL BE MADE. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, §
17.)
19. THAT NO PERSON SHALL BE ATTAINTED OF TREASON OR FELONY
BY THE LEGISLATURE. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 18.)
20. THAT NO ATTAINDER SHALL WORK CORRUPTION OF BLOOD,
NOR EXCEPT DURING THE LIFE OF THE OFFENDER, FORFEITURE OF
ESTATE TO THE COMMONWEALTH. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX,
§ 19.)
21. THE ESTATES OF SUCH PERSONS AS SHALL DESTROY THEIR OWN
LIVES, SHALL DESCEND OR VEST AS IN CASE OF NATURAL DEATH, AND
IF ANY PERSON SHALL BE KILLED BY CASUALTY, THERE SHALL BE NO
FORFEITURE BY REASON THEREOF. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX,
§ 19.)
22. THAT TiE CITIZENS HAVE A RIGHT, IN A PEACEABLE MANNER,
TO ASSEMBLE TOGETHER FOR THEIR COMMON GOOD, AND TO APPLY TO
THOSE INVESTED WITH THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES OR OTHER PROPER PURPOSES, BY PETITION, ADDRESS, OR
REMONSTRANCE. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 20.)
23. THE RIGHTS OF THE CITIZENS TO BEAR ARMS IN DEFENCE OF
THEMSELVES AND THE STATE SHALL NOT BE QUESTIONED. (See PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 21.)
24. THAT NO STANDING ARMY SHALL, IN TIME OF PEACE, BE KEPT
UP WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE; AND THE MILITARY
SHALL, IN ALL CASES AND AT ALL TIMES, BE IN STRICT SUBORDINATION
TO THE CIVIL POWER. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 22.)
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25. THAT NO SOLDIER SHALL, IN TIME OF PEACE, BE QUARTERED
IN ANY HOUSE, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OWNER, NOR IN TIME
OF WAR, BUT IN A MANNER TO BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW. (See PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 23.)
26. THAT THE LEGISLATURE SHALL NOT GRANT ANY TITLE OF
NOBILITY OR HEREDITARY DISTINCTION, NOR CREATE ANY OFFICE THE
APPOINTMENT OF WHICH SHALL BE FOR A LONGER TIME THAN DURING
GOOD BEHAVIOR. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 24.)
27. THAT EMIGRATION FROM THE STATE SHALL NOT BE PROHIB-
ITED. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 25.)
28. To GUARD AGAINST TRANSGRESSIONS OF THE HIGH POWERS
WHICH WE HAVE DELEGATED, WE DECLARE THAT EVERYTHING IN
THIS ARTICLE IS EXCEPTED OUT OF THE GENERAL POWERS OF GOVERN-
MENT, AND SHALL FOREVER REMAIN INVIOLATE; AND THAT ALL LAWS
CONTRARY THERETO, OR CONTRARY TO THIS CONSTITUTION, SHALL BE
VOID. (See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 26.)

